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No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault: Can
Family Law Learn from Torts?
TWILA L. PERRY*
Twenty years after enactment of the first no-fault divorce statute,1 no-fault
divorce remains controversial. In its early years, no-fault was hailed as an im-
portant innovation in family law which affirmed personal autonomy with respect
to intimate life choices, removed unnecessary pain from the divorce process and
eliminated the need for costly litigation tactics that posed a threat of undermin-
ing respect for the judicial process.2 In recent years, however, the no-fault sys-
tem has come under attack. Some have argued that no-fault divorce has hurt
women economically, stripping them of bargaining power that put them in a
stronger negotiating position under the system where proof of fault was re-
quired.3 While others contend that women are no worse off under no-fault than
they were under the fault system, 4 no one has argued that the economic inter-
ests of divorcing women are adequately protected under no-fault.
No-fault divorce has exacerbated a particular problem that has long con-
founded family law: articulating a theoretical basis for alimony. Alimony was
originally a remedy of the English ecclesiastical courts at a time when divorce,
in its modern sense, was not permitted. At that time, the only remedy available
for unsuccessful marriages was a legal separation, sometimes called a divorce a
mensa et thoro.5 Since there was no legal termination of the marriage, the
traditional duty of spousal support continued.' In America, however, absolute
divorce was available from the earliest colonial times.7 The English institution
of alimony, which served a clear purpose under English law, was imported into
American law.8 However, the legal basis for continuing a duty of support be-
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I. Family Law Act, ch. 1608, 331-32, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312 (1970).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 41-42.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 46-55.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 61 & 129-33.
5. This was also sometimes referred to as a limited divorce, or a "divorce from bed and board." CLARK. THE
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 12.1 (2d ed. 1988); O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of
a Theory, 23 N. ENG. L. REv. 437, 448 (1988).
6. Originally, the duty of spousal support was owed only by the husband to the wife. CLARK, supra note 5, at
§ 6.1. The duty was based on the fact that upon marriage, a woman lost her title to personalty and her right to
rents and profits from her realty. CLARK, supra note 5, at § 16.1. The wife owed a reciprocal duty to the hus-
band-the duty to provide domestic services. Id. Because under a divorce a mensa et thoro, which was not a true
divorce, the husband retained his rights with respect to his wife's realty and personal property, his duty to support
his wife continued. Since the Supreme Court decision in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), which held that alimony
must be awarded on a sex-neutral basis, it is clear that both spouses now owe the duty of support to each other.
7. American law always offered divorce more freely than English law did, in part because of the absence of
ecclesiastical courts. CLARK, supra note 5, at § 12.1. However, there was substantial variation in the marriage and
divorce laws from colony to colony. O'Connell, supra note 5, at 451. Divorce became more freely available in
England only after 1857, when divorce jurisdiction was transferred from the ecclesiastical courts to the civil court
system. CLARK, supra note 5, at § 12.1.
8. CLARK, supra note 5, at § 16.1.
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tween people no longer married to each other was not clear.' The courts began
to offer many rationales for alimony,' 0 but the lynchpins of that remedy became
the notions of fault and women's economic dependency.""
In recent years, both of these rationales for alimony have been seriously
undercut. Women have entered the workforce in increasing numbers, challeng-
ing the view that they are incapable of self-support, 2 and there has been wide-
spread adoption of no-fault divorce. Although the question of how much pro-
gress women have made toward economic independence may be open to debate,
the move to no-fault divorce has unequivocably demolished the fault rationale
for alimony. A number of scholars have noted that the theoretical basis of this
divorce remedy remains unclear,"a and some have concluded that awards of ali-
9. Professor Homer Clark has stated:
[wIhen the English institution of alimony, which served the plain and intelligible purpose of providing
support for wives living apart from their husbands was utilized in America in suits for absolute divorce
. . . its purpose became less clear. As a result of absolute divorce, the marriage is entirely dissolved. It is
harder to justify imposing on the ex-husband a continuing duty to support his wife than after a divorce a
mensa, which does not dissolve the marriage. This difficulty is not obviated by labelling alimony a "substi-
tute" for the wife's duty of support. Why should there be such a substitute? Would it not be more logical
to say that when the marriage is dissolved all rights and duties based upon it end?
CLARK, supra note 5, at § 16.1.
The rationale for alimony in America was also undermined in the 1830's, when the Married Women's Prop-
erty Acts began to restore to married women many of the rights they formerly lost upon marriage. See O'Connell,
supra note 5, at 448-59; CLARK, supra note 5, at § 7.2.
There is a further problem of logic. When a marriage ends, the duty of one spouse to perform services for the
other also ends. One could hardly imagine a court ordering one divorced spouse to continue to perform household
tasks for the other. However, the court does have the power to order one spouse to continue to support the other
financially. The fact that the obligations can continue on one side but not the other is, in the least, analytically
troubling.
10. Over the years, courts have offered a number of rationales for alimony including fault, Magruder v.
Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973); Mees v. Mees, 325 N.W.2d 207 (N.D. 1982), replacement of
the wife's dower rights, see, e.g., Glick v. Glick, 86 Ind. App. 593, 159 N.E. 33 (1927); Wesley v. Wesley, 181 Ky.
135, 204 S.W. 105 (1918); need, see, e.g., Mori v. Mori, 124 Ariz. 193, 195-96, 603 P.2d 85, 87-88 (1979), ability
of the economically stronger spouse to pay, Miles v. Miles, 185 Or. 230, 202 P.2d 485 (1949); MacDonald v.
MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951), awarding money to enable the custodial parent to stay at home
to care for children, Benvenuto v. Benvenuto, 389 A.2d 795 (D.C. App. 1978); Walton v. Walton, 354 So. 2d 464
(Fla. App. 1978), maintaining the standard of living and lifestyle of the marriage, In re Marriage of McNaugh-
ton, 145 Cal. App. 3d 845, 852, 194 Cal. Rptr. 176, 179 (1983); In re Marriage of Simmons, 87 Ill. App. 3d 651,
659, 409 N.E.2d 321, 327 (1980) and awarding money that will keep divorced spouses off the welfare rolls, see,
e.g., Bowzer v. Bowzer, 236 Mo. App. 514, 524, 155 S.W.2d 530, 535 (1941); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 188 F.2d 31,
33 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
II. When actual divorce became available in England, and when American states adopted secular divorce
statutes, alimony continued, primarily justified as a remedy for the "innocent" wife and as a means to address the
societal fact that women had few opportunities in the marketplace that would enable them to become economi-
cally independent. O'Connell, supra note 5, at 454-59; CLARK, supra note 5, at § 16.1.
12. See infra note 16.
13. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 5, at 620; 1. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4-5
(1989); O'Connell, supra note 5, at 438. One might ask why there is any more reason to impose a duty of support
on a former spouse than to revive the support obligation an ex-spouse's parents had during that spouse's minority.
The economically stronger spouse may have financial resources, but what is the rationale for forcing him to con-
tinue to share his income with a person who no longer has a duty to perform services for him? A person may
suffer a decline in his or her standard of living for any number of reasons. Should the fact that a person once had
a particular standard of living as a result of a marital relationship mean that he is guaranteed that standard
forever? The fact that many mothers of small children are now in the workforce weakens the argument that status
as custodial parent justifies an award of alimony, and the policy concerns that might justify an award sufficient to
keep a former spouse off of the welfare rolls does not supply a rationale for support in those cases not presenting
such extreme circumstances.
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mony have been fewer and lower under no-fault.14
This Article offers a rationale for alimony that is a departure from prior
theories15 and draws life directly from divorce in its modern no-fault cast. The
central paradigm of this Article is that divorce can be viewed as an accident in
which the losses are disproportionately imposed on one party. If divorce is
viewed as an accident, policies and analyses drawn from tort law can provide
the theoretical basis, in appropriate cases, for an alimony award.
There are many similarities between a divorce and an accident. In both
cases, neither of the parties involved planned for the unfortunate event to hap-
pen, neither wanted it to happen, both may have taken all possible care to guard
against its happening, but it happened anyway. Like an accident, a divorce can
result in long term economic loss.
It could easily be assumed that any analogy between tort law and divorce
would no longer be viable after the widespread enactment of no-fault divorce.
After all, a major purpose of no-fault was to remove from divorce proceedings
the whole issue of cruel, hurtful, or blameworthy behavior. But the analogy to
tort law still has potential to provide remedies to the party suffering losses at
the end of a marriage, if the idea of no-fault divorce is brought more into sync
with recent developments in tort law. Approaches such as no-fault insurance
and strict liability have eliminated consideration of fault in certain areas of
torts. They have focused, instead, on rationales and mechanisms to compensate
those who have suffered losses.
The party suffering economic loss at the end of a marriage is usually the
wife. Despite the increased number of women in the workforce in recent years,"6
in many middle class and upper middle class marriages,1 7 the wife limits her
14. No fault divorce was adopted in California in 1970. Lenore Weitzman's study of no-fault divorce in that
state revealed that between 1968 and 1972, the percentage of wives awarded alimony dropped from 20% to 15%.
WEITZMAN. THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION. THE UNINTENDED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN
AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 169, 388-91 (1985) [hereinafter THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION].
Weitzman's conclusions that women have fared less well with respect to alimony under no-fault divorce have
been supported in a study by Elizabeth Peters reported in Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and
Private Contracting, 76 Am. ECON. REV. 437, 446 (1986). Peters divided states into mutual consent states and
unilateral divorce states. She found that the average amount of alimony was higher in mutual consent states than
in unilateral divorce states. Id. at 449. Since there is no real difference in the substantive law governing alimony in
the states in the two groups, the inference may be drawn that in mutual consent states the bargaining process
between the spouse is similar to that which occurred prior to the enactment of no-fault divorce, i.e., the spouse
who does not wish to end the marriage has some degree of bargaining power that, in effect, requires the other
party to buy his way out. See ElIman, supra note 13, at 8 n.16.
Despite popular perceptions to the contrary, alimony is awarded in only a small percentage of divorces. THE
DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 169, 388-91. A recent Census report revealed that in 1988, of the 19.3
million ever-divorced or currently separated women in the United States, 16% had been awarded alimony pay-
ments. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY
1987 (1990). The award rate for Whites (18.3%) was about twice that of Blacks (7.6%). The rate for Hispanics
was 11.6%.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 94-133.
16. Between 1970 and 1984, the percentage of women in the workforce rose from 43.3% to 53.6%. For
married women, the percentage increased from 40% to 52.2%. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES XXi (1990) [hereinafter CENSUS].
17. Alimony is obviously a divorce remedy that has relevance primarily to the middle and upper classes. The
assumption in those contexts is that the husband has sufficient income to support himself while he continues to
assist his former spouse. However, there are many families in this country that operate at marginal economic
levels even while intact. Upon divorce, alimony is not an issue: the husbands simply do not make enough money to
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opportunities for career development outside of the home in favor of domestic
responsibilities. 8 The scenarios vary. The wife may work while her husband
acquires a professional degree, thus providing the economic mainstay of the
family while her husband obtains the training necessary to pursue a more lucra-
tive career. In other marriages, the wife may play the role of traditional house-
wife, providing domestic services and raising the children while the husband
advances in the workplace. In yet other marriages, both spouses work, but the
wife devotes less time to her career in order to meet family obligations. Under
any of these typical patterns, the wife may find herself at a serious economic
disadvantage in the event of a divorce. 19 The reality is that most families live on
incomes derived from employment, and most couples have little or no marital
property to divide.20 Most husbands earn more than their wives,2' and it is usu-
ally the husband's career that is enhanced by the wife's abandonment or scaling
down of her own. Unless after divorce both parties continue to share in the
income of the spouse whose career has been enhanced, the other spouse may
pay it. See infra note 21. For women in such marriages, the critical needs are for opportunities for education and
training, appropriate child care and the elimination of sex segregation and other forms of discrimination in the
workplace. There is an urgent need for more attention and resources to be directed to these issues which are of the
utmost importance to poor and minority women.
18. See S. BERK. THE GENDER FACTORY 7-10 (1985); Goldfarb, Marital Partnership and the Case for Per-
manent Alimony, in ALIMONY: NEW STRATEGIES TOR PURSUIT AND DEFENSE 48 (American Bar Association,
Section on Family Law 1988); Beninger and Smith, Career Opportunity Cost: A Factor in Spousal Support
Determination, 16 FAM. L.Q. 201, 203 (1982).
19. Mary Ann Glendon has noted that "the nature and degree of their labor force participation and com-
promises between work and child care means that mothers end up with relatively lower earnings, less power and
more vulnerability in divorce than fathers." M. GLENDON. THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 130
(1981).
This Article will discuss another marriage pattern: the two-income marriage in which there is no identifiable
sacrifice by the wife that reduces her income potential in the event of divorce. In such marriages, the wife is still
likely to suffer economic loss upon divorce because her earnings will often reflect the lower earning power of
women. See infra note 21.
Although the descriptions of marriage patterns in this Article refer to the wife as the spouse who tends to
sacrifice career development in favor of the marriage, and to the husband as the spouse whose career opportunities
have been enhanced, a similar analysis would apply if the roles were reversed. Certainly, there are some marriages
in which the wife is the primary breadwinner and the husband's career opportunities are compromised. However,
such a marital structure is the exception rather than the rule. Thus at the present time, referring to the parties as
husband and wife based on a presumption of the marital role allocations that are most prevalent in this society
seems justified. There are some points in the analysis that are gender specific. For example, the discussion of
market disparities, see infra text accompanying notes 180-83, and the discussion of the significance of some
women's choices to give priority to domestic responsibilities relate to issues that affect women differently than they
affect men. See infra text accompanying notes 177-79.
20. Studies have shown that most couples have little tangible property to divide at divorce. See, M. GLEN-
DON, THE NEW FAMILY, supra note 19, at 94; Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic
Consequences of Property. Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1181, 1190 (1981).
The two major financial awards possible at divorce are property and support. Support may be further divided
into two categories: alimony and child support. Alimony is distinguishable as payments made to the ex-spouse for
his or her own support. Although child support is thus distinct from alimony, as a practical matter, the standard
of living of the custodial parent and the child will be determined by the total amount of money coming into the
household, regardless of its formal designation.
The focus of this Article is on the wife's claim to alimony. However, a part of that claim may be based on the
fact that she scaled down her participation in the workforce to fulfill domestic responsibilites which included
childrearing.
21. According to a recent Census Report, the average weekly salary of White males is $452, while that of
White females is $318. The average salary of Black males is S347, while for Black females it is S288. For Hispan-
ics the relative figures were $307 for males and $260 for females. CENSUS, supra note 16, at 409 (1990).
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face a bleak economic future. Recently some scholars have called for a renewed
emphasis on alimony, and have noted the urgency of developing a rationale for
that remedy that is not undermined by no-fault divorce. 22
Part One of this Article compares the movement from fault to no-fault in
torts and family law. Part Two identifies important tort goals underlying the
shift to liability without fault in tort law and demonstrates that these goals are
useful for an analysis of the issues presented by divorce. Part Three identifies
existing rationales for alimony and other forms of economic awards and argues
that they are inadequate to meet the needs of divorced spouses. Part Four ana-
lyzes specific tort goals in greater detail, and then applies this analysis to the
no-fault divorce context.
Ultimately, the only protection for women in marriage is economic self-
sufficiency. But the day when most women will be able to achieve that status is
still far in the future. In the interim, there is a need to strenghten existing
divorce remedies so that they more effectively protect women's economic inter-
ests. Reconceptualizing no-fault divorce in a way that promotes more equal
sharing of divorce losses through alimony would be an important step toward
this goal.
I. FROM FAULT TO NO-FAULT IN FAMILY LAW AND TORTS
During the 1960's and 1970's, the concept of liability without fault ex-
panded its scope in both torts and family law.
A. Tort Law Develops
Approaches to compensation without proof of fault have a long history in
tort law. The workers' compensation system, which dates back to the first two
decades of this century,23 is an early example of an effort to address the need
for compensation for persons injured in certain employment contexts where ac-
cidents and injuries inevitably occur. Under this system, employees injured on
the job essentially trade an uncertain, expensive, but occassionally highly re-
warding tort action for a certain, inexpensive, but limited recovery of a fraction
22. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 5; Ellman, supra note 13; Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice,
67 N.C.L REv. 1103 (1989). See also Brinig and Cardone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62
TuL L. REv. 855, 984 n.152 (1988).
In recent years, there has been some movement away from the term "alimony." Alternative terms have
included "spousal support," "maintenance," and "spousal maintenance." It has been argued that such terms more
accurately reflect the idea of gender-neutral and fault-neutral claims based on need. See Ellman, supra note 13, at
10 n.20. To some, the term alimony may have negative connotations-most people have heard of the term "ali-
mony drone" and are well aware of the negative stereotype it invokes. Another word may indeed be preferable.
While what the transfer of wealth or income is called may be important, of more immediate concern is the
elaboration of an invigorated concept of spousal support after divorce. I defer the question of the most desirable
nomenclature to another time.
23. Ashford & Johnson, Negligence vs. No Fault Liability: An Analysis of the Workers' Compensation
Example, 12 SErON HALL L. REV. 725 (1982).
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of lost wages plus medical expenses. On the other side, the employer trades
potentially open-ended liability for a strict, limited, shared liability system.24
Beginning in the 1970's, the widespread system of workers' compensation
was joined by other compensation systems in which considerations of fault be-
came irrelevant. One was automobile no-fault insurance, seriously discussed in
the 1960's and enacted in a number of states in the 19701S.25 Although the
specific state statutory schemes vary, the general idea under no-fault is to re-
quire motorists to carry compulsory insurance to provide no-fault compensation
to persons injured by their vehicles. No-fault benefits awarded include coverage,
in varying amounts, for medical expenses and lost earnings.2 6
There have been other significant developments in no-fault compensation.
Some of these efforts have been sponsored by the federal government. The Na-
tional Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 198627 provides compensation to the
estimated seventy thousand children injured yearly as a result of immunization
injections against the serious childhood disease of pertussis. Under this Act,
there is no requirement that the vaccine be proved defective. Damages are to be
paid upon a showing that the victim was vaccinated and soon after suffered one
of the side-effects designated in the statute. 8 The Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 196929 provides compensation for workers suffering from coal
mining related respiratory disorders. To receive compensation, a miner must
show only that he has totally disabling black lung disease and that he con-
tracted the disease from coal mining related employment."0 A few private, elec-
24. Id., at 725 n.1, citing A. CONRAD. J. MORGAN. R. PRATT, C. VULTZ AND R. BOMBAGH. AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS 75 (1974).
Today, every state has a workers compensation provision. The various state programs differ in terms of their
elective or compulsory character, the industries covered, the limits on recovery and the question as to whether they
wholly replace or merely add on to the common law. Basically, however, such programs eliminate common law
employer liability to injured employees as well as the common law employer defenses such as contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk. Instead, they provide for certain, no-fault employee recovery for work-related inju-
ries. Ideally, the amount of recovery is 100% of medical expenses and 66 2% of wage loss. Recovery for pain and
suffering is not allowed. There are frequently ceilings on maximum income loss recovery and limitations on the
period of time for which an injured employee may recover even though his losses and income need may continue.
Id., at 725 n.l. Employers are generally required to purchase insurance, post bonds or make other showings of
financial ability to meet potential liability under the various worker's compensation statutes. Id.
25. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR RE-
FORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965) [hereinafter BASIC PROTECTION]. For a general description of existing
no-fault plans, see King, State No-Fault Systems: Attorney's Guide to Statutory Provisions, 4 PACE L. REV. 297
(1984).
26. See generally BASIC PROTECTION, supra note 25; see also; King, supra note 25.
27. P.L. 99-660. This Act was part of an Omnibus Health Bill, S. 1744 signed by the President on November
14, 1986. See 44 CONG. Q. 2920 (Nov. 15, 1986).
28. See S. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 106-10 (1989). The Act also covers
victims of some other designated vaccines. Id. Pertussis immunization is required almost everywhere before chil-
dren can enroll in school. It has been established that a small proportion of children who receive the immunization
will suffer serious injuries. Id. at 107. See also, Schwartz and Mashigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
of 1986. An Ad Hoe Remedy or a Window for the Future? 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 387 (1987). For a discussion of
earlier federal vaccine injury compensation plans, see Reitze, Federal Compensation for Vaccine Induced Injuries,
13 B.C. ENVTL AFT. L. REV. 169 (1986).
29. Pub.L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat 792 (1969).
30. M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN. TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 744 (4th Ed. 1987). For the current version
of the Act see 30 U.S.C. §§ 3801 et. seq. See also The Federal Black Lung Program: The View From the Top, 87
W. VA. L. REV. 575 (1985).
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tive no-fault plans have also been adopted. One, popularly known as the Wel-
lington Plan, creates a voluntary system through which those claiming injuries
from asbestos can process claims against participating asbestos manufacturers.3 1
Another plan, known as the Scholastic Lifetime Medical and Disability Policy,
provides for no-fault settlement offers in connection with catastrophic injuries of
high school athletes.3
2
The concept of fault also underwent substantial change during this period
through the doctrine of strict liability. The precise evolution of this doctrine
remains unclear, although it seems to have deep historical roots.3 3 In the 1960's
and early 1970's, however, strict liability was expanded on a number of fronts:
as a theory of recovery for injuries by defective products,3' by an expansion of
liability for ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activities,35 by an expan-
sion of recovery for harms caused by pollution,36 and by an expansion of land-
owners' liability.3  In each context, the focus was on relieving the plaintiff's
burden of proving negligence and holding manufacturers, landowners and others
who subject the public to certain hazards liable for the injuries they cause. Al-
though application of strict liability in and of itself did not always guarantee a
plaintiff's recovery, 38 removal of the requirement that the plaintiff prove fault
did substantially increase the liklihood of compensation.
B. No-Fault Divorce
During the same years that no-fault compensation plans and strict liability
in tort were being expanded, the concept of fault was also undergoing a dra-
matic change in the law of divorce. In place of a system in which a spouse
seeking divorce was obliged to prove that the other spouse had engaged in
blameworthy behavior sufficient to terminate the marriage, no-fault divorce per-
31. The claimant need only prove an asbestos related disease and some level of dysfunction. FRANKIN &
RABIN. supra note 30. at 745.
32. FRANKIN & RABIN, supra note 30, at 745-46. This plan was developed by Professor Jeffrey O'Connell, a
pioneer and leading figure in the development of no-fault automobile accident insurance. For further discussion of
the plan, see O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees of Postaccident
Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898, 903-04, 914-15 (1985).
33. The concept of strict liability appears in court decisions in the mid 1800's imposing liability for escaping
fires, water, straying cattle and rampaging wild animals. It also was invoked in the late 1800's to impose liability
for injuries caused by blasting. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 30, at 23-27, 434. See also Rylands v. Fletcher,
L.R.3, 3 H.L. 330 (1868); Sullivan v. Dunham, 161 N.Y. 290, 55 N.E. 923 (1900) (discussing earlier cases
involving liability for blasting).
34. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897
(1963); Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal.3d 413, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443 (1978).
35. See, e.g., Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11, 250 N.E.2d 31, 302 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1969) (liability for
property damage caused by blasting without physical invasion of the damaged property); Indiana Harbor Belt
R.R. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 662 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (liability for spill of acrylonitrile-a
flammable and toxic liquid chemical).
36. State v. Ventron, 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983) (mercury pollution emanating from a tract of land
on which defendants conducted mercury processing); Atlas Chemical Industries Inc. v. Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (discharge of waste products into a stream where products settled on plaintiff's land).
37. In so doing, a number of courts have adopted the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R.3, 3 H.L. 330
(1868) which had previously been rejected by many American jurisdictions. See, e.g., Cities Service Co. v. State,
312 So.2d 799 (Fla. 1975) (dam break permitted escape of phosphates into body of water killing fish and inflicting
other damage); State v. Ventron, 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983) (pollution from mercury processing plant).
38. See Infra text accompanying notes 136-37.
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mitted termination of the marriage on the mere assertion by one spouse that the
marriage had irretrievably broken down.3 9
1. The Genesis of No-Fault
No-fault divorce was a product of the times. The 1960's was a period
marked by a dramatic shift in social values. The institution of religion, which
had previously been inextricably linked to notions of sin and fault in divorce
law, declined in importance.40 There was increased emphasis on personal auton-
omy with respect to intimate life choices. 4' No-fault divorce reflects the view
that individuals have a right to define the quality of their relationships and that
the state should not force them to continue in marriages they no longer consider
viable.
No-fault divorce also addressed concerns long expressed about certain neg-
ative effects of the fault system. For example, even where both spouses were
agreeable to a divorce, they were still required to prove to the court that some
fault ground had been committed by one of them. This often resulted in sham
trials in which perjury and collusion were rampant, often taking place with the
court's implicit consent. Scholarly work calling for no-fault divorce argued that
there was a need to rid the legal system of requirements that necessitated be-
havior and tactics that were demeaning to judges, lawyers and litigants and that
posed a danger of diminishing public respect for the courts.42 Every state now
has some provision for no-fault divorce. 43 In some states, fault concepts still
39. For an example of a typical no-fault statute, see the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 302(2), 9
U.L.A. 181 (West 1987). Statutory provisions vary from state to state. In some states, fault grounds exist along-
side no-fault grounds. For a compilation of state approaches, see Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty
States, 23 FAm. L.Q. 514-16 (1990).
40. Max Rheinstein described a shift from a "Christian-conservative ideology" to a "cudemonistic-liberal
one." M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY. DIVORCE AND THE LAW 10-11 (1972). Carl Schneider has identified
the evolution of family law as being due to a combination of the legal tradition of non-interference in family
affairs, the ideology of liberal individualism, changing moral beliefs and the rise of "psychologic man." Schneider,
Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1807 (1985).
41. During the 1960's and 1970's, the Supreme Court decided a number of cases that established constitu-
tional protection from state interference with respect to certain intimate life choices. See, e.g., Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (economic restrictions on marriage); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage).
42. See. e.g., Steinbock, The Case for No-Fault Divorce, 10 TULSA LJ. 427 (1975); Walker, Beyond Fault:
An Examination of Patterns of Behavior in Response to Present Divorce Laws, 10 J. FAM. L. 267 (1971); Can-
nell, Abolish Fault-Oriented Divorce in Ohio: As a Service to Society and to Restore Dignity to the Domestic
Relations Courts, 4 AKRON L. REV. 93 (1971). The courts had also expressed concern about the prevalence of
perjury and collusion. See, e.g., Garcia v. Garcia, 105 Cal. App. 2d 289, 233 P.2d 23 (1951); Potter v. Potter, 101
Fla. 1199, 133 So. 94 (1931).
Professor Herma Hill Kay has described the elimination of hypocrisy and perjury as one of the major goals
and enduring achievements of no-fault. Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CALIF. L
REV. 291, 299 (1987).
43. Many no-fault divorce statutes were enacted in the 1970's. Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective
on No-Fault Divorce and its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 51-55 (1987) [hereinafter Equality and Differ-
ence]. See generally Friedman, Rites of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 664-
65 (1984). Today, every state provides for some form of no-fault divorce. FREED & WALKER, supra note 39, at
514. On March 14, 1985, South Dakota became the last state to adopt no-fault divorce. II FAta. L. RPTR. 3015
(1985).
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affect alimony or property division rules, 44 and some states specifically consider
economic misconduct to be relevant.4 5 However, in many states, fault may not
be considered in dividing the financial wealth of a marriage.
2. The Economic Consequences of No-Fault
Whereas compensation of the victim was central to the development of no-
fault tort schemes and strict liability, compensation of spouses suffering eco-
nomic loss was an overlooked issue in the enactment of no-fault divorce.
A number of writers have argued that the economic disaster divorce often
spells for women 4 has been exacerbated by no-fault.47 The analysis, familiar to
many, is as follows: Under the fault system, characterizations of spouses as "in-
nocent" or "guilty" were very important.4 Divorce was considered a remedy for
the injured, innocent party. Upon a showing of recognized grounds for divorce, 49
the "innocent" 50 party was awarded a divorce. The finding of fault often also
had another important function-it affected the distribution of the financial
wealth of the marriage.5 Divorce was a system of corrective justice. The party
deemed guilty of fault often had to suffer financially. A "guilty" husband would
have to pay alimony to his "innocent" wife.5 2 Also, if an "innocent" wife be-
44. See 1. ELLMAN, P. KuRTz & A. STANTON. FAMILY LAW. CASES, TEXT PROBLEMS 265-76 (1936); FREED
& WALKER, supra note 39, at 546-47.
45. FREED & WALKER, supra note 39, at 532-33.
46. See. e.g, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 13; Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and
Economic Consequences of Property. Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1249-53
(1981); McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM.
L.Q. 351 (1987); Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79 (1986). Families headed
by divorced and separated mothers are a rapidly growing part of this nation's poor. See Ehrenreich & Piven, The
Feminization of Poverty: When the Family Wage System Breaks Down, 31 DISSENT 162 (1984). The National
Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity has estimated that if current trends continue, the poverty population
of the United States will be composed soley of women and children by the year 2000. National Advisory Council
on Economic Opportunity, CRITICAL CHOICES FOR THE 80's 1 (1980).
47. No-fault divorce has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology. Con-
tradiction, and Social Change: A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Di-
vorce, 1983 WIs. L. REV. 789, 880-85; Murray, Family Law, Twelfth Survey of Florida Law, Part One, 30 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 107, 108 (1976); A Decade of No-Fault Divorce: What it has Meant Financially for Women in
California, I FAM. ADVOCATE 10, 15 (Spring 1979); Peters, No-Fault Divorce and Bargaining over the Divorce
Settlement, in ALIMONY: NEW STRATEGIES FOR PURSUIT AND DEFENSE, 65, 70-74 (American Bar Association,
Section of Family Law 1988). See also Cochran & Vitz, Child Protective Divorce Laws: A Response to the Effect
of Parental Separation on Children, 17 FAM. L.Q. 327 (1983) (challenges wisdom of no-fault divorce laws that do
not include a significant waiting period). See also Peters, supra note 14, at 446 (1986).
48. See, e.g.. Brown v. Brown, 198 Tenn. 600, 613, 281 S.W.2d 492, 498 (1955) (citing Brewies v. Brewies,
27 Tenn. App. 68, 178 S.W.2d 84 (1946). See also Morrison v. Federico, 120 Utah 75, 232 P.2d 374 (1931);
Hamm v. Hamm, 30 Tenn. App. 122, 204 S.W.2d 113 (1947); Strickland v. Strickland, 183 Or. 297, 192 P.2d
986 (1948).
49. Typical grounds for divorce included mental cruelty, physical cruelty, adultery, and abandonment. See
CLARK, supra note 5, at §§ 13.1-13.7.
50. The term "innocent party" refers to the spouse who was in a position to prove that the other spouse was
guilty of some fault ground for divorce. Obviously, with respect to the breakdown of many marriages, there are no
innocent or guilty parties. Instead, the marriage ends as a function of irreconcilable differences or incompatibility.
51. See CLARK, supra note 5, at § 16.1. O'Connell, supra note 5. at 466-67.
52. In many states, a "guilty" wife could not be awarded alimony. CLARK, supra note 5, at § 16.1. There was
a lack of logic to this system of alimony based on "innocence" and "guilt." Until the United States Supreme
Court case of Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), in many states, only women could be awarded alimony. An
"innocent" husband could not receive alimony no matter how needy he was. Also, under the old system, a woman
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
lieved she would suffer financially as a result of divorce, she could simply refuse
her husband's request for a divorce. Under such a system, fault provided a bar-
gaining lever.5" The "innocent" party could simply require the "guilty" party to
purchase his way out of the marriage, and leaving could be an expensive
proposition.
It has been observed that no-fault divorce shifted the bargaining power
over economic issues from the spouse who did not want a divorce to the spouse
who did.54 Now, the party desiring to leave the marriage could simply leave,
wait out the appropriate time period, and then obtain a divorce regardless of the
wishes of the other spouse. The spouse who did not wish to end the marriage
lost the bargaining leverage she had under the fault system.55
The most prominent of the critics of no-fault divorce is Lenore Weitzman.
In her 1985 book, The Divorce Revolution: The Unintended Consequences of
No-Fault Divorce for Women and Children, Weitzman reported on a ten-year
research project on the effects of no-fault divorce in California. Her conclusion
was that women and children have been hurt and hurt badly by no-fault. Weitz-
man found essentially that the equal division requirement mandated under Cali-
fornia's community property system had lowered property awards to women be-
low the unequal but higher awards some women had received under the fault
system.56 She further concluded that awards of spousal support were generally
lower than they had been under the fault system. 51
Some writers have embraced Weitzman's view that no-fault divorce has
been an economic disaster for women.58 Some have even advocated a return to
fault.59 Some have disagreed with Weitzman's methodology, findings, or conclu-
sions.60 Others are ambivalent on the issue of whether women are actually
who was deemed "guilty" of marital fault but who had been a major contributor to the wealth accumulated
during her marriage, could receive no alimony. At the same time, a woman who contributed little to the marriage,
but could not be proved to have engaged in behavior that constituted fault could receive an alimony award. For an
extensive discussion of the evolution of the relationship between alimony and fault grounds for divorce, see
O'Connell, supra note 5.
53. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between legal rules and bargaining behavior in the
context of divorce, see THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 26-28; FINEMAN, supra note 47, at 801-02;
Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 952-54
(1979); ELLMAN, supra note 13, at 6-7.
54. THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION supra note 14 at 26-28; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 53, at 952-54,
968-69 (1979); Fineman, supra note 47, at 801-02.
55. See THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 26-28; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 53, at
952-54, 968-69 (1979); Fineman, supra note 47, at 801-02.
Professor Kay states that taking the "blackmail out of divorce was not an unintended consequence of the
reform movement in California" even in the views of the Governor's Commission or in the Uniform Laws Com-
mission. Equality and Difference, supra note 43, at 62-63. However, she also notes that there was no intention to
deprive either men or women of the capacity to negotiate a fair agreement. Id. at 63.
56. THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 74-75. Weitzman noted that where there was insufficient
offsetting property some judges interpreted the no-fault divorce law to require sale of the family home in order to
make an equal division of the marital property. Id. at 78-84.
57. Id. at 163-80.
58. See articles cited supra note 47. See also supra note 14.
59. See Golden & Taylor, Fault Enforces Accountability, 10 FAM. ADVOCATE I I (Fall 1987); New Conflict
Over Fault: Is it an Idea Whose Time has Come Again, 10 FAM. ADVOCATE I (Fall 1987).
60. See, e.g., Jacobs, Faulting No-Fault: A Review of Lenore Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unex-
pected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
767. (disputes Weitzman's quantitative data, her generalization of the California experience to the entire nation,
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worse off under no-fault.6 1 Regardless of the merits of these arguments on the
effect of no-fault, there is little dispute that women continue to suffer economi-
cally as a result of divorce. 62
Experts dispute the reasons no fault divorce did not ensure a mechanism
for better economic recovery for women.6 3 Professor Weitzman suggests that
the proponents of no-fault set out to treat men and woman equally upon divorce
but instead unintentionally devised a system that has functioned to the detri-
ment of women and children.6 4 Professor Herma Hill Kay differs. Her view is
that the California Governor's Commission on the Family, which made the ini-
tial recommendation for the adoption of no-fault, did not have as a primary goal
equality of the sexes. In fact, she states, the Commmission recommended a
number of measures that would have helped to protect the economic interests of
women who were being divorced. According to Professor Kay, a major part of
the problem is that the law that was finally enacted did not adopt these recom-
mendations. Professor Kay also notes that the law that was passed contained a
provision stating that the judge should take into account the ability of the sup-
ported spouse to engage in gainful employment and that this probably resulted
in lower alimony awards.65 The law eventually enacted in California, which did
and her conclusion that the problems presently faced by divorced women are the product of no-fault divorce);
Singer, supra note 22 (arguing that Weitzman ignored many negative attributes of the fault system). Some have
argued that the California analysis cannot be applied to other states. Because California is a mandatory equal
division community property state, it was often necessary for the family home to be sold in order to make the
required equal divison. Also, in California, only no-fault divorce is available-California is one of the states that
has abolished fault grounds. Thus, some contend that a combination of these factors permitted no-fault divorce to
have consequences in California that it might not have in states where the substantive law is different. See G.
Dullea, How Women Fare in No-Fault Divorce, N.Y. Times (1988).
61. Mulroy, No-Fault Divorce: Are Women Losing the Battle, A.B.A. J. 76 (November 1989) (the answer as
to whether women are worse off is not a simple yes or no). See also Singer supra note 22.
62. See supra note 46.
63. Professor Herma Hill Kay, who was a participant in the process resulting in the enactment of the first
no-fault statute in California, notes that in that state, no-fault "was shaped by many different persons whose ideas
were as contradictory as they were complimentary." Equality and Difference, supra note 43, at 27. At the time
the California statute was being considered, the women's movement was in its early stages, there were no organ-
ized feminist groups and no-fault was supported by most of the women who were involved in its enactment. Id. at
56. Lenore Weitzman has also noted that no organized women's group participated in the debate on the new law.
THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 364-65.
Obviously, men had no interest in arguing that there was a need to evaluate the potential economic conse-
quences of no-fault divorce on women. Professor Kay has noted that "the only organized interest group involved in
the California reform effort was an association of divorced men who felt they had been treated unfairly and who
thought divorce should be removed from the courts." Id., at 56.
64. THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 16-41. See Equality and Difference, supra note 43, at 3.
65. Professor Kay argues that although the Commission did not have among its goals the achievement of
equality between the divorcing parties, its proposals did take into account the differential impact of divorce on
men and women and sought to avoid that impact. But the legislature ignored many of the Commission's proposals.
Equality and Difference, supra note 43, at 27-55. One proposal deemed particularly important was the establish-
ment of a Family Court which, among other functions, would have offered dissolution counselling covering all
aspects of separation and divorce including financial issues. Professor Kay states:
The Family Law Act made two significant changes in the Governor's Commission proposal concern-
ing the financial aspects of marital dissolution that subtly altered the way judges would interpret the
statute. The first was a change in the statutory language concerning the division of community property.
The Commission, as I have noted, proposed an equal division of community property as the general rule
but made clear that an unequal division could be ordered if the economic circumstances of the parties
required it. The Family Law Act did not mention the possibility of an unequal division of the community
property. Instead, it permitted an exception to the equal division rule where economic circumstances war-
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not provide adequate economic protections for women, heavily influenced the
positions adopted in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act and in the han-
dling of no-fault divorce in other state legislatures."6
Many of the reasons for enacting no-fault divorce were valid ones. Protec-
tion of the integrity of the courts is a laudable goal. Recognizing individual
autonomy with respect to intimate life choices is important in principle, and for
the individuals involved, it certainly is nice that divorce has become a far less
unpleasant process. But, the pain and possible humiliation of a divorce proceed-
ing involving proof of fault pales in comparison to the lifelong consequences of a
negotiated settlement or court decree under no-fault that leaves one party eco-
nomically disadvantaged.
II. THE DIVORCE/ACCIDENT ANALOGY
In thinking about the relevance of tort law to divorce, what readily comes
to mind is the relationship betweefi fault grounds for divorce and various inten-
tional torts. Thus, mental cruelty can be analogized to the intentional infliction
of mental distress; physical cruelty can be analogized to battery or assault.67 In
a structure in which divorce was a remedy for the innocent, injured spouse
against the guilty one, the finding of fault provided a logical rationale for con-
tinuing the husband's duty to support his wife after termination of the mar-
riage.68 Thus, as in a tort action, the "wrongdoer" was required to compensate
the "victim"-alimony could be seen as a form of damages.69
ranted the award of a particular asset to one party on conditions appropriate to effect a "substantially
equal" division of the property. Thus the Act authorized a much narrower exception from the equal divi-
sion approach than the Commission would have done. Secondly, the Family Law Act specifically directed
the judge to consider the supported spouse's ability to engage in gainful employment when setting the
spousal support award. Although this direction was softened somewhat by the accompanying admonition
not to interfere with the interests of children in the custody of the supported spouse, the statute could be
read as urging judges to encourage ex-wives to go to work. That interpretation was reinforced by the 1969
legislative report drafted by Assemblyman Hayes in which he specifically cited the increasing number of
working married women and called attention to their 'approaching equality with men.' The Governor's
Commission had made no similar statement in the 1966 Report. Instead, as I have noted, the Commission
recognized that a mandatory equal division of the community property might be unfair to women and
children.
Id. at 42.
66. See Equality and Difference, supra note 43, at 51-55. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act appears
to take a hostile approach to alimony. The official comment to § 308 states that "[o]nly if the available property is
insufficient for the purpose and if the spouse who seeks maintenance is unable to secure employment appropriate
to his skills and interests or is occupied with child care may an award of maintenance be ordered." UNIFORM
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT, § 308 official comment, 9 U.L.A. § 348 (West 1987).
67. The defenses to fault grounds, connivance, condonation, collusion and recrimination also had tort ana-
logues. Thus they implied consent, forgiveness or fault on the plaintiff's part. CLARK, supra note 5, at § 12.1 at
409. Professor Homer Clark has commented that "The divorce decree thus came to resemble a tort judgment,
both being granted for the fault of the defendant causing harm to the plaintiff, and both being denied where the
plaintiff either consented or was himself at fault." Id. at 409. There were also possible contract and criminal law
analogues to some of the fault grounds. For example, in some states, adultery was also a crime. CLARK, supra
note 5, at § 13.02 at 498. Today most states have abolished the criminal offense of adultery. Id.
68. Singer, supra note 22, at 1110-13.
69. The analogy has also been drawn between alimony and damages for breach of contract. See, e.g., Kelly v.
Kelly, 183 Ky. 172, 180, 209 S.W. 335, 338 (1929) (alimony as damages for breach of the marriage covenant),
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However, now that the shift has taken place from fault to no-fault, alimony
can no longer be rationalized as compensation flowing from the guilty to the
innocent. Still, no-fault divorce can learn from tort law by beginning to draw
upon recent developments in torts grounded in the idea that compensation must
be paid regardless of fault for certain kinds of losses. Thus, through recent de-
velopments such as no-fault insurance and strict liability, tort law has, in some
contexts, shifted the focus from inquiries concerning fault to rationales and
mechanisms promoting compensation. Specifically, family law should look to
the tort doctrine of strict liability as a guide for developing an approach to
distributing the economic losses stemming from divorce.
Looking to tort law for guidance is particularly appropriate because, in
many ways, a divorce can be analogized to an accident. Each is an unexpected
event that may be the fault of no one but results in serious economic loss.
Most people would probably define an accident as an unexpected event in
which one person was injured as a result of the carelessness of another. But in
tort law, the happening of the accident itself can be separated from the notion
of fault. Thus, an accident can be neutrally described as an interaction between
persons that results in harm."° Joseph Steiner has described an accident as "in-
teraction damage."' 1  An accident has also been described as an event resulting
in an injury where the happening of the incident was unavoidable. In other
words, an accident can be defined as an injury that occurs without fault.7 2
Before the ideas of no-fault and strict liability gained in acceptance in the
1960's and 1970's, accidents and divorces received similar treatment in the legal
system. In each case, the party suffering losses was subjected to what in essence
was a lottery: maybe she received compensation; maybe she did not.7 3 In both
contexts, that person was obliged to litigate her case. The litigation was costly,
the outcome was uncertain, and any compensation ultimately awarded was
often received only after substantial delay. Moreover, the amount of compensa-
tion awarded for similar losses could vary dramatically from case to case, and,
frequently, the compensation was inadequate.
70. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333, 347
(1984).
71. Steiner, Economics. Morality and the Law of Torts, 26 U. TORONTO LJ. 227, 227 (1976).
72. See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850) (an "inevitable accident" is an accident the
defendant could not have avoided by the use of ordinary care). The term sometimes used is "unavoidable acci-
dent." W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 162 (5th ed. 1984). Other terms include "mere
accident," "pure accident" and "accident." Id. at n.l. See also Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 (Utah
1980) where the court stated that "[u]navoidable accident, rather than being a separate legal doctrine, is simply a
recognition of the fact that an incident causing injury to the plaintiff does not necessarily give rise to liability in
the defendant." Id. at 834.
It could be argued that a divorce is different from an accident because while an accident occurs without
intent, divorce is an event clearly intended by at least one of the parties. This argument does not undermine the
analogy. Although the act of divorce itself is intentional, at the time of the marriage neither party intended that
the venture they were about to undertake would end in that result. Moreover, in a no-fault analysis, where the
reason for the end of the marriage is generally "irretrievable breakdown," issues of intent with respect to the
injury-causing event should be irrelevant.
73. See Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L.
REV. 774 (1967).
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During the 1960's and 1970's, some tort law scholars began to analyze
these problems of uncertainty, inconsistency, cost, and delay as failings of a tort
system based on negligence. They began to parse out what they considered to be
the different components of a tort. They divided a tort into a number of parts
including the occurrence of the accident, the costs of the accident, and the issue
of fault. They then began to identify the costs of the accidents, especially the
economic costs. In his landmark book, The Costs of Accidents, 74 Professor
Guido Calabresi makes a clear delineation between fault and costs and before
seeking to determine what type of system would most effectively reduce acci-
dent costs.
A. Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Divorce Costs
Calabresi defines three types of accident cost reduction goals, which he
derived from primary, secondary, and tertiary accident costs. The primary costs
of accidents are the costs to the individual occasioned by the occurrence and
severity of the accident itself.75 Primary costs include physical pain, emotional
suffering, and sheer inconvenience.
Secondary costs of accidents are the societal costs resulting from acci-
dents.7 These costs include the economic costs to the individual and to society
once the accident has occurred; secondary costs can also be described as conse-
quential costs. Such costs to the injured person include items such as medical
bills and lost wages. They also include money that must be paid to others to
perform household or other tasks the injured party is no longer able to do. The
larger society may incur secondary costs as a result of an accident where public
funds must be used to support injured persons who lack the economic resources
to meet their increased financial needs.
Finally, tertiary costs are the costs of administering the system that deter-
mines who, if anyone, is liable for the other accident costs. 77 Tertiary costs in-
clude the costs to the public of administering the courts and the costs to the
litigants of prosecuting or defending their cases.
A Calabresian analysis can be applied to divorce. There are costs to the
individuals involved simply due to the occurrence of the event. The primary
costs of divorce include emotional pain and the disruption of habits, patterns,
physical space, and interpersonal relationships.
Secondary divorce costs consist of the economic costs of marital breakdown
to the individual and to society.
Let us look more closely at the costs that are the primary focus of this
Article: the economic costs to the spouse who has sacrificed or compromised her
career in order to further the interests of her marriage. There is a tendency to
think of the economic issues arising out of divorce as involving determinations
as to how the economic wealth of a marriage is to be distributed. This analysis
74. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
75. Id. at 26.
76. Id. at 27.
77. Id. at 28.
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may be quite appropriate in cases where there is substantial tangible property to
divide. However, where one spouse has given a low priority to her own interests
in the long term interest of the marriage, and at the end of the marriage there
is little tangible property, that spouse suffers a loss. The question at divorce,
then, should be how to distribute this loss rather than how to distribute gains.
Spouses who have forgone or scaled down their own career development in
favor of that of their spouses suffer many kinds of losses. Sometimes there have
been direct contributions of money to the other spouse. In other cases, the
spouse may have lived a life deprived of material assets that would otherwise
have been available.7 8 There is often a residual loss in earning capacity during
the period she remains outside of the workplace or pursues her career in a less
intense way than would have been the case absent family responsibilities.7 9 If
she later makes a decision to undertake professional or other specialized train-
ing, she may be faced with inflated tuition and other increased costs.80 In gen-
eral, to the extent that priorities were set to benefit the enhanced spouse, the
other spouse lost the benefits that might have inured to her had the priorities in
the marriage been different.8 '
In drastic cases, the economic dislocation experienced by the economically
weaker spouse at the end of a marriage can also affect the larger society. In the
most extreme cases, the public may have to support women, often with children,
who are unable to support themselves. The "feminization of poverty" has be-
come an issue commanding national attention.82 Even in less extreme cases,
there can be societal costs. The physical, financial and emotional stresses on
custodial mothers can be substantial. Although many function admirably in the
face of these difficulties, in some instances, parenting capabilities may be ad-
versely affected. This can have a negative impact on long term developmental
processes in their children.83
Divorce also has administrative or tertiary costs. Although no-fault has re-
duced the litigation formerly necessary to prove fault grounds, terminating a
marriage can still be expensive. In a case involving the equitable distribution of
78. See Batts, Remedy Refocus: In Search of Equity in "Enhanced Spouse/Other Spouse' Divorces, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 762-63 (1988).
79. See Ellman, supra note 13, at 49.
80. Batts, supra note 78, at 793.
81. A few courts have phrased the contributions of the non-enhanced spouse in terms analogous to injury and
loss. In Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984), for example, the court said that "'a spouse
who has been handicapped socially and economically by his or her contributions to a marriage shall be compen-
sated for such contributions at the termination of the marriage insofar as this is possible." Id. at 208, 343 N.W.2d
at 800 (misquoting Legislative purpose, ch. 105, § 1 (1977) of Divorce Reform Act). In a sense, the spouse who
has sacrificed her individual career prospects is, with a no-fault gloss, like the tort plaintiff who has suffered the
loss of an opportunity as a result of a defendant's actions. Thus, there are tort cases where, for example, the
defendant physician failed to perform tests that would have revealed that the plaintiff had a condition that would
have been amenable to early treatment. As a result, the plaintiff's chances for recovery were lost or diminished. In
the context of divorce, the spouse who has forgone career opportunities has, by virtue of divorce, also lost the
chance to maximize her possibilities.
82. See, e.g.. McLindon, supra note 46, at 404 (noting that unfair child support awards can result in pov-
erty). See generally Ehrenreich & Piven, supra note 46.
83. See, e.g., J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY. SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE
WITH DIVORCE (1980); J. WALLERSTEIN & S. BLAKESLEE. SECOND CHANCES: MEN. WOMEN AND CHILDREN A
DECADE AFTER DIVORCE (1989).
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property, substantial money may be spent on lawyers, appraisers, and other pro-
fessionals to determine the value of real estate, other financial investments, and
professional practices. Since there is no legal theory that clearly provides the
basis for an award of alimony, and limited duration alimony has gained some
popularity in recent years,84 more money may have to be spent to demonstrate
to the court that alimony is warranted or that it should be permanent. Finally,
divorce also imposes administrative costs on society. Although no-fault has
probably reduced the cost of individual divorces, 85 the increase in the divorce
rate86 has kept the administrative costs of divorce to society relatively high.
Calabresi concluded that the losses occasioned by an accident should be placed
on what he called the "cheapest cost avoider"-the party, as between the plain-
tiff and the defendant, who was in the best position to more cheaply take the
steps necessary to avoid the accident.87 He judged this strict liability to be ap-
propriate on the grounds that it provided for immediate, certain recovery, and
reduced litigation costs. 88 Calabresi's cheapest cost avoider model cannot simply
be superimposed on the context of divorce. However, the focus of Calabresi and
others on developing approaches that avoid some of the disadvantages of a sys-
tem based on proof of negligence was innovative and important.89
Once the fault element is removed from divorce, what remains is an acci-
dent-an unfortunate event that results in costs to the individual and to society.
Just as tort scholars have sought to reduce the costs of accidents by separating
fault from costs, a true no-fault approach to divorce costs should also separate
costs from fault and focus on developing a no-fault analysis aimed at reducing
and redistributing some of the economic losses associated with divorce.
B. Tort Policies and Their Relevance
Once we acknowledge that in many ways tort law has moved toward no-
fault and strict liability, it may be useful to examine tort goals, purposes, and
policies to see whether they provide useful guidance in the divorce context. Dif-
ferent tort doctrines have embodied different purposes or goals, but there is con-
84. See infra text accompanying notes 108-12.
85. Eliminating the requirement of proof of fault means a decrease in costs for the time spent by judges and
other court personnel.
86. Between 1965 and 1985, the number of divorces increased from 479,000 to 1,190,000 annually. CENSUS,
supra note 16, at 86. After a sharp increase between 1960 and 1980, changes in the divorce rate have been
minimal. See id.
87. CALABRESI, supra note 74, at 311-12. A detailed discussion of Calabresi's solution would require more
space than could be appropriately devoted to it in this Article. Essentially, he proposed that liability be determined
by a system of categorical rules placing liability prospectively on specified parties for various kinds of accidents.
For further discussion of Calabresi's approach see Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective
on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 654-57 (1971). Not surprisingly, there has been substantial discussion of
the question of how to determine who is the cheapest cost avoider. See id; Calabresi, Views and Overviews, 1967
U. ILL. L. REV. 600.
88. CALABRESI, supra note 74, at 135-40, 261-63.
89. Franklin, supra note 73. It should be noted that these recent approaches to strict liability and no-fault
insurance schemes are still controversial in tort law. See, e.g., Epstein, Automobile No-Fault Plans: A Second
Look at First Principles, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 769, 789-90 (1980); Blum & Kalvan, The Empty Cabinet of Dr.
Calabresi: Auto Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 239 (1967); see also Calabresi, Fault,
Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalvan, 75 YALE L. 216 (1965).
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siderable overlap between policies used to justify strict liability and no-fault tort
approaches.
The movement toward no-fault compensation schemes and strict liability in
the 1960's and 1970's reflected numerous instrumental, fairness, and adminis-
trative concerns. In their 1965 landmark book, in which they advocated replace-
ment of the negligence system with a no-fault system for addressing the prob-
lem of automobile accidents, Keeton and O'Connell emphasized the goals of
compensation, reducing administrative and litigation costs, and promoting
roughly comparable treatment for people who have suffered similar losses. 90
The cases adopting strict liability in tort also reflect many different con-
cerns which are balanced when determining whether to impose liability without
fault in a particular context. In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,9 1
the landmark concurring opinion of Justice Traynor explained the purposes of
strict liability in the products liability context. His reasons for imposing liability
without fault included the need for compensation of the individual suffering the
loss, the difficulty of proving fault, the need to encourage defendants to take
steps to reduce the relevant hazard, and the ability of the defendant to obtain
insurance and thereby distribute its losses to the public as a cost of doing
business. 92
In another development, in State, Department of Environmental Protection
v. Ventron 9 3 the court held that landowners could be held strictly liable for
harms arising from pollution on their property even if they do not know that the
property is polluted. The policies articulated were decreasing the burden on the
public fisc, providing compensation to innocent victims, and the greater ability
of the defendants to prevent the harm. 4
If we analyze these rationales as a set, the move away from fault-based
liability reflects an attempt to accomodate diverse goals including compensation,
deterrence, reduction of litigation costs, fairness, reliance, and consistency.
Where strict liability is imposed, it is not because of fault, but as a matter of
public policy. An analysis of the goals of strict liability can also be persuasive in
the context of divorce. However, before analyzing each of these goals and their
application to no-fault divorce, it is important to understand why alternative
90. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL BASIC PROTECTION, supra note 25, at 1-5. See also R. KEETON, J.
O'CONNELL & J. MCCORD. CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE V (1968).
91. 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
92. Id. at 462-63, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring). The Restatement (Second) of Torts also
stated the rationale for strict liability in the products context:
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to be that the seller, by
marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility to-
ward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and
does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that
reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental
injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be
treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of
such products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to
afford it are those who market the product.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A comment c (1977).
93. 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983).
94. Id. at 488, 497, 499, & 468 A.2d at 157, 162, & 163-64.
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modes of legal analysis have not proven sufficient to provide a justification for
alimony.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING RATIONALES
The problem of achieving economic fairness for divorced women has com-
manded the attention of many writers, yet solutions have proved elusive.
Neither community property nor equitable distribution are very helpful to
women in marriages in which little property has been accumulated. 5 While the
debate over the treatment of professional degrees has received substantial atten-
tion,"8 the reality is that this issue is relevant in relatively few marriages. 97 In
recent years, divorce has been analogized to the termination of a contract and
the dissolution of a partnership. There has been exploration of the use of quasi-
contract remedies. Theories of restitution, rehabilitation, human capital, and en-
couraging sharing behavior have been invoked. For some skeptical of the judi-
cial system, there has been increased exploration of the option of the antenup-
tial contract-an option in which the parties themselves contract in advance of
the marriage concerning economic settlement in the event of divorce.
All of these approaches have significant potential to improve the economic
awards to some financially disadvantaged spouses upon divorce. Yet, none of
these approaches has provided a convincing theoretical or practical basis for
alimony.
95. Weitzman's critique of the effects of no-fault in California illustrates the problem with the community
property system. Initially, one might think that a community property system, in which tangible assets are split
evenly, would provide adequate protection for divorced women. However, as Weitzman and others have noted.
equal division of the marital property has often required the sale of the marital home. This frequently resulted in a
decline in the standard of living that the economically weaker spouse had little likelihood of improving. THE
DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 78-96. See also Fineman, supra note 47, at 833-42 (criticizing Wiscon-
sin rule requiring equal division of property upon divorce).
Nor has equitable distribution, which was adopted by many states about the same time as no-fault, been a
panacea. In recent years, equitable distribution has also been criticized as unfair to women. See, e.g., THE Di-
VORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 106-09 (citing studies in both New York and New Jersey concluding that,
under equitable distribution, wives were typically being awarded less than half the tangible property). See also
Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REV. 1553, 1555-57. Most equitable distribution statutes
state the factors courts should consider in dividing property, but provide no guidance as to how those factors
should be weighed or as to what the goal is other than fairness. As a result, the decision of the court as to how
marital property is to be divided is very dependent on judicial discretion. See THE UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 238-39 (1987).
96. See. e.g., Graham v. Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978): O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576,
489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985). See also Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education:
Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 U. KAN. L. REV. 379 (1980); Erickson, Spousal
Support Toward the Realization of Educational Goals: How the Law Can Insure Reciprocity, 1978 WIs. L. REV,
947 (1978).
97. The professional degree issue is only relevant in those marriages in which one spouse puts the other
through school and the marriage ends before any significant marital property can be accumulated. Most courts
that have addressed the issue have determined that professional degrees do not constitute marital property. See.
e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982); Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074
(1985). So far, New York stands alone in its determination that professional degrees are marital property.
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
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A. Contract
Under the contract analysis, marriage is compared to a civil contract.98
Upon dissolution, remedies are sought to protect the spouse's "expectancy inter-
ests" in the marriage.99
The contract analysis of intimate relationships has been criticized in some
detail.100 It has been argued, for example, that it is difficult to define with speci-
ficity the promise sought to be enforced when alimony is awarded at the end of
a marriage.1 There is also a problem in defining exactly what constitutes a
breach of a marital agreement in a way that does not let consideration of fault
in by the back door.' 02
A different kind of contract analysis is based on the parties entering into an
antenuptial contract addressing the issue of alimony. But the option of planning
for alimony by an antenuptial contract or a contract entered into during the
marriage is also problematic. First, some courts refuse to enforce contracts deal-
ing with support obligations after divorce.103 Another problem is determining
what happens to the agreement in the event of changed circumstances. The law
has not yet developed an adequate approach to this complex issue.104 Perhaps
the most difficult problem facing those who would rely on the antenuptial con-
tract is the potential inequality in bargaining power between the spouses. Be-
cause of their generally stronger economic position, men are likely to have more
bargaining power than women in negotiating antenuptial agreements. The
courts have made no consistent determination as to the degree to which they
will be willing to apply traditional contract law principles to alleviate this prob-
98. There are a number of cases in which one spouse has sought to assert a contract claim against the other
in divorce. See, e.g., Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 350-53, 661 P.2d 196, 200-03 (Ct. App. 1982) (contract
claim failed on the facts, but award was made on the basis of unjust enrichment). Some courts decline to follow
the contract analysis. See, e.g., McDermott v. McDermott, 129 Ariz. 76, 628 P.2d 959 (Ct. App. 1981). For
further discussion of the application of contract principles to intimate relationships, see L. WEITZMAN. THE MAR-
RIAGE CONTRACT: SpousEs. LOVERS AND THE LAW (1981); Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New
Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204 (1982); Temple, Freedom of Contract and Intimate Relationships,
8 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 121, 153 (1985). See also Fleischmann, Marriage by Contract: Defining the Terms of
the Relationship, 8 FAmI. L.Q. 27 (1974); Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1497, 1518-19 (1983); Brinig & Carbone, supra note 22.
Weitzman, Shultz, Temple and Fleischman have argued that spouses should be able to structure the terms of
their ongoing marriage by contract. However, the courts continue to refuse to enforce contracts that purport to
alter the traditional duties of support and services. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, § 587 (1932) ("A bargain
between married persons or persons contemplating marriage to change the essential incidents of marriage is ille-
gal"). See also Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. Mich. 1940). See supra note 6.
99. See, e.g., Brinig & Carbone, supra note 22. In this article, the authors advocate application of contract
damages principles to alimony. However, they concede that under no-fault statutes, the basis for spousal support is
not clear. Id. at 894 n.152.
100. See Ellman, supra note 13, at 13-33; Chambers, The "Legalization" of the Family: Toward a Policy of
Supportive Neutrality, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 805, 820-23 (1985); Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A
Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1161-69 (1981).
101. See Ellman, supra note 13, at 16-23. This assumes that the promise is not a mere promise to remain
married, but is also a promise that reflects more specific understandings between the spouses.
102. See ElIman, supra note 13, at 23-24.
103. See, e.g., Connolly v. Connolly, 270 N.W.2d 44 (S.D. 1978); Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
104. See, e.g., Perry, Dissolution Planning in Family Law. A Critique of Current Analyses and a Look
Toward the Future, 24 FAM. L.Q. 77 (1990).
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lem. Where serious bargaining disparities exist, contracting can be dangerous
since the contract may only serve to formalize a power imbalance that already
exists between the spouses.' 0 5 Finally, the application of contract law to divorce
continues to be limited by the fact that to a large extent, the law continues to
analyze marriage not as a contract but as a status.10 8
Although the contract approach to marriage has proved a popular one and
contract law has definitely become more flexible in recent years,1 07 family law
must be cautious in placing too much emphasis on this analogy. Even contract
scholars like Grant Gilmore have commented on the growing obsolescence of
much of contract doctrine and have noted the growing merger of contract into
tort. 08
B. Reimbursement and Rehabilitative Alimony and Restitution Theory
In recent years, there has been the emergence of two new alimony doc-
trines: restitution alimony and rehabilitation alimony. These doctrines are in-
deed controversial. On the one hand, they may be thought of as rationales to
justify awards of alimony in situations where there might otherwise be no
award. On the other hand, they can provide rationales for making alimony
awards of limited duration, in contrast to the traditional award that continued
until remarriage or death.
A specific doctrine of restitition, or reimbursement, alimony has been ap-
plied by some courts in cases involving professional degrees. 109 Under this doc-
trine a spouse who has underwritten the costs of the other spouse's education is
reimbursed for her expenses." 0 However, reimbursement alimony is a limited
105. Antenuptial contracts present a number of other problems. It is not clear, for example, how contract
doctrines such as impossibility, impracticability and unconscionability will apply to antenuptial contracts. Id. at
100-05.
106. See ElIman, supra note 13, at 13. However, the recent history of marriage has been described as mov-
ing, in many ways, from status to contract. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 47, at 796; GLENDON, supra note 19, at
101-18.
107. For a discussion of the ways in which contract law is becoming more flexible, see Shultz, supra note 98;
Temple, supra note 97.
108. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). The attempt to move the analysis of family law
issues closer to evolving approaches to tort law can be placed within a larger jurisprudential context. In The Death
of Contract, Grant Gilmore contended that there has been a gradual dismantling of the formal system of contract
theory, in which there was substantial reliance on formalisms such as offer, acceptance and consideration. Id. at
65-66. He argued that these formalisms are being replaced by a broader view of laws, especially remedies. As a
result of doctrines such as quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel, contract and tort are essen-
tially becoming one. Id. at 87-88. Moreover, Gilmore argued that tort law is gaining ascendency. He gives the
example of the area of products liability, where strategies for recovery have rapidly gone from emphasizing con-
tract warranty theories to focusing more on tort theory. See id. at 92-94. He also notes the expansion of tort
through § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the use of increasingly liberal interpretations of its
provisions to impose liability on more defendants. Id. at 92-94.
This does not mean that we should abandon the search for contract remedies in the marriage context. Despite
the criticisms, there are analogies between commercial contracts and intimate relationships that deserve further
exploration. The point is that contract doctrine cannot be simply superimposed onto the family law context. Fam-
ily law must develop sui generis principles to govern its own needs. These principles can borrow from other areas,
whether contract, property, tort, or any other.
109. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
110. See, e.g., id.; Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 353-54, 661 P.2d 196, 203-04 (Ct. App. 1982).
[Vol. 52:55
NO-FAULT DIVORCE
remedy, which may not include many of the actual expenses incurred."' It also
does not cover the opportunity costs and other possible measures of losses that
may have been suffered by the spouse who financially assisted the other. As a
practical matter, restitution alimony would be relevant in only a small number
of divorces.
The goal of rehabilitative alimony is to restore the wife to economic inde-
pendence by requiring the husband to pay alimony for a limited period. During
this period, the wife is expected to undertake education or training that will
make her economically self-sufficient." 2 Not suprisingly, rehabilitative alimony
has been sharply criticized." 3 It is obviously unrealistic to think that a longtime
housewife will cover her divorce losses by obtaining a college degree at the age
of fifty. Even in less extreme cases, this remedy does little to reduce the dispro-
portionate losses many women suffer. In addition, the term "rehabilitative" may
seem to some to make the alimony recipient sound like either a victim or a
criminal.
A more general doctrine of restitution as a basis for alimony in cases not
involving professional degrees also invites criticism. Restitution requires that
three elements be proved: that defendant received a benefit; that the benefit was
conferred at the plaintiff's expense; and that defendant's retention of the benefit
would be unjust."' 4 The third element often presents a problem because reten-
tion of a benefit is not deemed unjust if the benefit was conferred with donative
intent."' The court's analysis of this issue depends on a judge's own subjective
views as to whether one spouse's actions that benefit the other are done with
donative intent or with an expectation of benefit."" Such subjective determina-
tions establish no clear legal right to alimony in cases involving spousal
sacrifice.
C. Partnership
A number of writers have analogized a divorce to the termination of a
partnership." 7 Under this approach, the capital contributions and all assets of
the partnership are divided between the partners.
I 11. For example, Indiana limits reimbursement to tuition, books and laboratory fees. See IND. CODE ANN. §
31-1-11.5-11(d) (Burns 1990).
112. See, e.g., Reback v. Reback, 296 So. 2d 541, 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); McDowell v. McDowell,
670 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
113. See. e.g., Note, Rehabilitative Alimony: An Old Wolf in New Clothes, 13 REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 667
(1985). See also, Avirett v. Avirett, 187 N.J. Super. 380, 383, 454 A.2d 917, 919 (1982) (describing rehabilita-
tive alimony as male-oriented and sexist).
114. Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment: From Status to Contract and Back Again?, 77
MICn. L. REv. 47, 52 (1978).
115. Id. at 53.
116. See Ellman, supra note 13, at 24-28.
117. See Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1255-58
(1974); Sharp, The Partnership Ideal: The Development of Equitable Distribution in North Carolina, 65 N.C.L.
REV. 195, 198-201 (1987); Krauskopf, A Theory for "'Just" Division of Marital Property in Missouri, 41 Mo. L.
REV. 165 (1976). The partnership analogy has also proved attractive to some courts in their analysis of divorce.
See. e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 585, 489 N.E.2d 712, 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 747 (1985); see also
Rummel v. Rummel, 265 N.W.2d 230 (N.D. 1978).
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The partnership analogy has also been criticized."18 It has been noted, for
example, that marriage has a wider range of objectives than a mere business
partnership." 9 Marriages tend to begin with implicit assumptions about roles
and expectations, whereas business partnerships generally begin with explicit
negotiations about such matters. 120 Also, many business partnerships plan for
dissolution at the outset.121 It has been argued that the partnership model does
not support awards of alimony because after the fruits of the relationship have
been divided in a business partnership, each party goes his separate way with no
continuing obligation to the other. 2 2 Forcing a husband to continue to support
his ex-wife is inconsistent with the partnership model.
D. Human Capital Theory
There are a number of approaches to this theory. 23 Human capital theory
is based on the idea that when a wife underwrites the cost of professional train-
ing of her husband or withdraws from the paid labor force in order to devote
herself to domestic responsibilities, she invests in her husband's "human capi-
tal" rather than her own.12 4 Upon divorce, she should receive a return on her
"investment" in the family firm.The theory has been criticized as being overly
focused on quantitative measurements which require expensive expert testimony
and as not being useful for taking into account less tangible, but nonetheless
important, contributions. 25
E. Sharing Principles
A number of writers have argued that divorce remedies should be based on
the idea that marriage is a relationship in which the sharing of responsibilities is
critical. Under this approach, one purpose of the laws governing divorce should
118. See Batts, supra note 78, at 756 n.21; Fineman, supra note 47, at 836-42. But cf. Grant, How Much of
a Partnership is Marriage?: Community Property Rights Under the California Family Law Act of 1969, 23
HASTINGS Li. 249 (1971).
119. Under traditional partnership law, the relationship must be for the purpose of profit. See J CRANE & A.
BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 63 (1968). Although enhancing financial well-being may be a goal of one or
both marriage partners, most people would probably agree that profit is not the primary goal of the marriage
relationship.
120. See GLENDON, supra note 19, at 65.
121. O'Connell, supra note 5, at 497.
The partnership analysis has also been characterized as not helpful in the professional degree context. There,
the marriage is often dissolved before any substantial assets have been accumulated. Under the partnership analy-
sis, no profits have been realized and the "capital contribution" of the sacrificing spouse may be considered too
diffuse and intangible to be recognized. See Weitzman, supra note 117, at 1258; Batts, supra note 78, at 756 n.21.
122. O'Connell, supra note 5, at 499.
123. See, e.g., Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUDIES 35 (1978); Combs, The Human Capital
Concept as a Basis for Property Settlement at Divorce: Theory and Implementation, 2 J. DIVORCE 329 (1979);
Krauskopf, supra note 96; Parkman, The Recognition of Human Capital as Property in Divorce Settlements. 40
ARK. L. REv. 439 (1987); Beninger & Smith, supra note 18.
124. Krauskopf, supra note 96, at 387-88.
125. See O'Connell, supra note 5, at 503; see also Parkman, supra note 123, at 450-53, 457-67 (criticizing a
number of human capital models).
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be to encourage and reward sharing behavior.12 The argument is that whenever
spouses have different earning capacities and want to plan rationally as a single
economic unit, they will decide to shift career emphasis to the higher earning
spouse. Therefore, the lower earning spouse is more likely to either play the
traditional role of homemaker, or at least, carry a disproportionate share of the
domestic responsibilites. 117 Under sharing principles, this pattern represents an
economically rational choice to maximize family income. Alimony constitutes
compensation at divorce for the loss in earning capacity arising from such shar-
ing behavior. 2 8 Although this approach is attractive, its basis in the law seems
unclear. Although many courts may acknowlege the need for sharing in mar-
riage, they may be less willing to adopt sharing as the theoretical basis for ali-
mony without it being linked more closely to established principles of law.
F. Return to the Fault System
Some writers have advocated a return to the fault system.129 Such a move
is unlikely. Moreover, a return to fault will not insure that more needy spouses
will be awarded alimony.
First, it must be noted that even under the fault system, awards of alimony
were relatively rare. 30 It has been argued that women were no better off,"13 and
even might have been worse off under fault. Since alimony was awarded only to
an "innocent spouse," a number of women could not be awarded alimony re-
gardless of their need or their contributions to the marriage. 132 For example,
continuation of alimony was sometimes linked to post-divorce sexual conduct. 3'
Also, women who failed to perform what were viewed as their "proper" marital
duties might not be awarded alimony.134
Although divorce is economically devastating for many women, reinstitut-
ing fault would be unlikely to result in fewer divorces. The spiraling divorce rate
is a reflection of many factors, not simply the ease with which a divorce may be
obtained." 35 Finally, a number of the reasons for enacting no-fault divorce were
126. For articles stressing sharing principles, see, for example, Ellman, supra note 13; Laughrey, Uniform
Marital Property Act: A Renewed Commitment to the American Family, 65 NEB. L. REv. 120 (1986); Prager,
Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2-14 (1978) (sharing principles
reflect and reinforce important characteristics of marriage).
127. ElIman, supra note 13, at 45-47.
128. Id. at 3.
129. See supra note 59.
130. Singer, supra note 22, at 1106.
131. Kay, supra note 55, at 67 (expresses doubt that women fare substantially better after divorce in states
that permit fault divorce or that permit consideration of fault in economic determinations than in "pure" no-fault
states).
132. Singer, supra note 22, at 1110.
133. See, e.g.. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 13 Md. App. 65, 71, 281 A.2d 407, 410 (1971) (noting that post-divorce
"flagrant misconduct" may justify revocation or modification of alimony); Lindbloom v. Lindbloom, 180 Minn. 33,
35-36, 230 N.W. 117, 118 (1930) (post divorce sexual conduct may be a factor in terminating alimony).
134. Singer, supra note 22, at 1112-13. It should be noted that despite her criticisms of no-fault divorce,
Weitzman does not advocate a return to fault. Rather, her position seems to be that the retention of fault grounds
in states that still have them might offer women some protection. See THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION. supra note 14,
at 383.
135. Other factors contributing to the higher divorce rate include changing social mores and the increased
economic independence of women. These were also factors contributing to the enactment of no-fault divorce. See
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good ones. Granting increased recognition to personal autonomy and eliminat-
ing sham trials and the perjury they encouraged were positive developments for
individuals, the legal system, and society as a whole.
IV. ANALYSIS OF TORT GOALS
In tort law, there are a number of contexts where strict liability has been
applied to hold one party liable for the losses of another without proof of fault,
but the parameters of strict liability are still unclear. The courts are still strug-
gling with the question of how far and to what kinds of activities strict liability
can extend."36 Moreover, mere application of the doctrine to a particular area
does not ensure that injured parties invoking it will be compensated. In products
liability, for example, the plaintiff still must prove that the product in question
is "defective,"13' 7 and still must meet the traditional tort requirments of causa-
tion-in-fact and proximate cause.' 38 However, even though many aspects of
strict liability remain unsettled, there is substantial similarity between the goals
sought to be furthered by that doctrine'3 9 and the goals of divorce that would be
furthered by a strict liability approach to alimony.
Under a strict liability approach, alimony can be seen as a remedy to com-
pensate a spouse suffering disproportionate losses 40 as a result of the accident
of divorce. Alimony, like tort damages, serves the function of income replace-
supra text accompanying notes 40-42. See also Frank, Berman & Mazur-Hart, NoFault Divorce and the Divorce
Rate: The Nebraska Experience-An Interrupted Time Series Analysis and Commentary, 58 NEB. L. Rv. 1, 25-
30 (1978); McGraw, Sterin & Davis, A Case Study in Divorce Law Reform and its Aftermath, 20 J. FAM. L. 443
(1981-82).
136. Courts have started to address issues such as whether strict liability applies to bailors and lessors of
goods, see, e.g., Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); sellers of used
goods, see. e.g., Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 286 Or. 747, 596 P.2d 1299 (1979); franchisors, see, e.g., Kosters v.
Seven-Up Co., 595 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1979); and contractors following specifications, see, e.g., Michalko v. Cooke
Color & Chemical Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 179 (1982). Compare Elmore v. American Motors Co., 70 Cal.
2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969) (extension of strict liability to bystanders) with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977) (taking no position on the bystander issue).
Indeed, to some extent, the whole doctrine of strict liability remains controversial. See, e.g., Posner, A Theory
of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUDIES 29 (1972).
137. The plaintiff must prove that the product is in "a defective condition unreasonably dangerous." See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977); W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 72, at 695.
138. Winnett v. Winnett, 57 I11. 2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974); Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich.
163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959); W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 72, at 710. Also, under certain circumstances,
plaintiff's own conduct will bar or reduce his recovery. But the question of what defenses are available in strict
liability is a complex one. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 523, 524 (1977); Daly v. General
Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). See also, Note, Assumption of Risk
and Strict Products Liability, 95 HARV. L. REV. 872 (1982).
139. Obviously, these different tort goals overlap to some extent. For example, fairness and compensation are
both goals of tort law. But fairness can also be described as a goal of compensation. See, e.g., James, Damages in
Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 582, 583 (1956) (it is "eminently fair that these damages should (at least) put
the plaintiff, as nearly as may be, in the same position he would have been in if defendant's wrong had not injured
him").
140. The argument is not that the economically more powerful spouse suffers no losses at the time of divorce.
For many middle class couples, the income that supported one household rather comfortably simply cannot sup-
port two households at the same level. However, there is empirical research that suggests that, for many men, any
initial economic losses suffered at the time of divorce are soon made up. See infra note 167. Even assuming that
both spouses continue to suffer long term economic losses, the spouse who has invested in the marriage at the
expense of her career suffers a disproportionate loss.
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ment in a context where there is good reason to compensate the individual suf-
fering the loss, and good reason to impose the cost on the other party.
A rationale for alimony based on strict liability is not designed to com-
pletely supplant the other theories of alimony analyzed in Part Three of this
Article. Those theories have been criticized, but it must be remembered that
they are relatively new and still evolving. Just as it has been shown that fitting
any one of them to the family law context is problematic, a theory based on
strict liability is also not a perfect fit. The point is simply that family law can
draw on certain principles underlying strict liability that address analogous con-
cerns. 141 The challenge here, as with the other approaches, is to adapt principles
drawn from other areas to the family law context. 14'
The issue of alimony can arise as a result of any one of the typical middle
or upper middle class marriage patterns summarized in the Introduction to this
Article. One pattern is where one spouse has made very specific, identifiable
sacrifices in favor of the marriage, such as working while the other spouse at-
tends graduate or professional school. In another pattern, the sacrifices of the
wife may be more diffuse. The homemaker who takes care of the home may
provide an environment of relative comfort and stability which enables the other
spouse to concentrate on building his career. A third marriage pattern is one in
which both spouses work, and there are children. Here the wife is still more
likely than the husband to spend a disproportionate amount of time on domestic
duties, including child care. 43 As a result, she invests less in her career than her
husband does in his. Some two-earner marriages may not fit into this sacrifice/
compromise model. In such cases, the wife often suffers economic loss upon
divorce because of general marketplace disparities between the incomes of men
and women, rather than because of the role she played in the marriage. 44 Al-
though the disadvantaged spouse in each of these marriage patterns may have a
legitimate claim to alimony, not all of the strict liability rationales apply equally
to each context.
Finally, the strict liability approach developed in this Article should apply
regardless of which spouse makes the decision to terminate the marriage. It is
true that much of the discussion in this Article is premised on a set of facts in
which the husband ends the marriage after the wife has made a substantial
investment and has yet to reap her rewards. Although it seems reasonable to
assume that fewer middle-aged women walk out on their husbands than vice-
versa, it certainly must be acknowledged that there are women who make the
141. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93.
142. The need for development of new doctrine was noted by Professor Robert Levy, who was the Reporter
in connection with the drafting of the 1970 Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. Noting the loss of bargaining
power of wives as a result of no-fault, he noted the importance of the issue of "[H]ow to provide adequate, long-
term financial protection for the 'innocent' wife who can be divorced against her will by virtue of new, non-fault
grounds for divorce. . . . [S]atisfactory resolution of this problem will require path-breaking and imaginative
divorce-property doctrines." R. LEVY. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALY-
sis, app. B, B-I to B-18 (1969) (document prepared for the Special Committee on Divorce of the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws), (cited in Kay. supra note 43, at 46).
143. See generally A. HOCHSCHILD & A. MACHUNG. THE SECOND SHIFT: INSIDE THE Two-JoB MARRIAGE
(1989); R. HERTZ. MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS: WOMEN AND MEN IN DUAL CAREER MARRIAGES (1986).
144. See infra notes 181-84.
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decision to terminate their marriages. This happens even under circumstances
where the women know that they will suffer serious economic disadvantage.
The question as to which party actually takes formal steps to terminate the
marriage should be irrelevant under a no-fault, strict liability analysis. An ad-
vantage of strict liability is that it places the focus not on the conduct of the
parties, but on the losses suffered. Thus, the question of whether it was the wife
or the husband who made the decision to end the marriage should be irrelevant.
Under the sacrifice/benefit paradigm, a wife who terminates her marriage
should still be compensated for economic loss.
A. Compensation and Loss Sharing
Compensation for losses is obviously one of the primary goals of tort law. 1"
Although there is a growing willingness to compensate for psychological
harm,'146 the focus of compensation in most tort cases remains on economic
loss. 147 An important part of economic loss is the loss of future earnings or
diminution in earning capacity. 4 8
145. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF
A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 4-29 (1984) [hereinafter TOWARD A JURISPRU-
DENCE OF INJURY]. See. e.g., United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 453 F.2d 147, 150-51 n.1 I (3rd Cir. 1971)
("the underlying philosophy of tort law . . . is that the plaintiff should be compensated for the harm he has
suffered").
146. See. e.g., Battalla v. State of New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961)
(abandoning physical impact rule); Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984)
(permitting recovery if plaintiff was within the zone of danger). California has had a very interesting evolution of
the issue of emotional harm beginning with Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968); see generally, Bell, supra note 70.
147. Obviously, many divorces are accompanied by emotional pain. The question could be raised as to
whether, under a tort analogy, recovery would be permitted for emotional loss. In tort law there is an increased
willingness to allow recovery for emotional harm. See supra note 146. Moreover, some feminist scholars have
emphasized conceptions of the law that give increased recognition to the importance of attachments, intercon-
nectedness and emotional interdependence. See, e.g., Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the
Maternity and Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, at 1159-61; Minow, "Forming Underneath Every-
thing That Grows:" Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 819, 893. In the kinds of marriage
patterns described in the Introduction to this Article, the wife who has compromised her own goals in favor of her
marriage may suffer feelings of anger, loss, and disappointment in addition to her economic losses. Her opportu-
nity to enter another marriage relationship may be minimal and she may also lose whatever psychic benefits she
would have derived from being, for example, the wife of a business executive. Meanwhile, the husband retains the
psychic benefits of his professional status and his chances for remarriage are likely to be greater. See infra text
accompanying notes 167-70. Wallerstein has identified patterns of resentment in some divorced women so severe
as to impair effective parenting for years. See supra text accompanying note 83. Although emotional harm may be
difficult to measure for the purpose of damages, this has not posed a barrier to recovery in the tort context. There
it has been noted that compensation for psychological injury may serve the purpose of restoring a level of satisfac-
tion to life in general, and of replacing areas of satisfaction that the accident had taken away. See generally, Bell,
supra note 70, at 398. However, finding a legal basis to support recovery for emotional losses in the context of
divorce is difficult. It is widely understood that divorce is often accompanied by at least some degree of emotional
pain to either or both spouses regardless of which spouse made the decision to end the marriage. Moreover,
although the law varies from state to state, the trend has been to eliminate causes of action based on hurt feelings
arising out of the breakdown of intimate relationships. See W. WADLINGTON. DOMESTIC RELATIONS 105-22
(1984).
148. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983); United States v. Varner, 400
F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1968); D. DOBBS. HANDBOOK OF REMEDIES § 8.1 (1973).
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Although the terminology of "compensation" is not always used, family
law also clearly recognizes that compensation is an important divorce goal. 149
Thus, both the community property and the equitable distribution systems,
though defective in operation, are theoretically designed to compensate the
lower earning or homemaker spouse for her contributions to the marriage. The
idea of compensation also underlies at least some of the theories or rationales
that have already been advanced for alimony. Under a contract theory, alimony
may be argued to constitute compensation for the losses caused by a breach of
the marriage contract. 50 Under the "sharing theories," it is compensation for
the losses caused by sharing behavior. 51
In tort law, there are three parties who can bear the losses incurred as the
result of an accident: the injurer, the victim' 52 or society. Under the negligence
system, the losses incurred as a result of an accident are shifted from the in-
jured to the injurer only upon a finding of blameworthy behavior. However,
under systems such as workers' compensation, automobile no-fault and other
no-fault schemes, the losses are compensated in a different manner. They are
paid for by what is essentially a system of insurance, one usually operated with
some form of state involvement. 5 3
But who should bear the burden of compensating the spouse who suffers
losses at divorce as a result of sacrificing behavior? It could be argued that the
economic losses resulting from a divorce should be spread among as large a
number of people as possible. One potential loss-spreading device would be the
development of public or private insurance programs designed to compensate
spouses economically injured by divorce.' 5 4 Obviously such a fund could not
fully compensate particular individuals for all of their losses. However, payment
of a lump sum might offset a least a few of the expenses incurred during the
adjustment period immediately following a divorce. At this point in time, the
149. Sometimes courts do speak explicitly in terms of compensation. See. e.g., Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis.
2d 200, 318 N.W.2d 798 (1984) ("a spouse who has been handicapped socially and economically by his or her
contributions to a marriage shall be compensated for such contributions at the termination of the marriage insofar
as this is possible").
150. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 126-28.
152. This includes the victim's family. In the absence of compensation from another source, the victim's
family may have to bear the economic loss resulting from the loss or reduction in the victim's wages. The family
may also have to replace, at cost, the services the victim once performed in the home.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 23-32. There are presently a number of other no-fault compensation
programs to provide income replacement, at least temporarily, for those unable to provide for themselves because
of injury or disease. Examples of these are state temporary disability schemes, employee sick leave or disability,
plans, illness and accident insurance, veteran's disability benefits, and social security benefits.
154. This possibility has been mentioned but never developed. In his preliminary report to the body that
promulgated the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, Professor Robert Levy stated that "sound solutions to the
problem of the dependent divorced spouse will ultimately be achieved not by reform of divorce-property doctrines,
but by careful expansion of a nationwide social insurance system." R. LEVY, supra note 142, at 186. To date,
however, no such programs have been enacted to cope with the economic losses resulting from divorce.
Accident compensation schemes have been proposed with respect to a wide variety of injuries. See, e.g.,
Meyer, Regulating Catastrophes through Financial Requirements: A Model State Statute, 20 HARV. J. ON
LECIS. 441 (1983) (nuclear accidents); Fleming, Drug Injury Compensation Plans, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 297 (1982)
(drug injuries); Soble, A Proposal for the Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substance Pollution
A Model Act, 14 HARV. J. ON LEols. 683 (1977) (injuries and diseases caused by toxic chemicals); Havighurst,
"Medical Adversity Insurance"--Has its Time Come?, 1975 DUKE Li. 1233 (medical malpractice).
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immediate availability of funds could make the difference between the need to
seek immediate employment and the option of educational training that could
improve long term economic prospects . 55 An on-going monthly payment might
make up some of the difference that would otherwise exist between pre- and
post-divorce lifestyles.
It seems doubtful that a purely private system of divorce insurance would
be effective. Insurance systems are generally based on the idea that many more
people will pay into the system than will be paid money from it. With the high
rate of divorce in recent years, it seems doubtful that private companies would
find the divorce insurance business to be a profitable one.5 6
Another possibility would be the development of a public social insurance
system. The idea that the Government might act as an insurer to compensate
people for injuries is an old one in tort jurisprudence. 57 However, at present,
the only form of public social insurance for divorce provided by the Government
is welfare, or, for a few women whose marriages were of long duration, social
security benefits.' 58
There are two ways that money could be raised for an insurance fund to
assist divorced spouses. One possibility would involve taxing the activity that
creates the risk: putting a tax on marriage. This could be a fiat yearly tax on all
married couples or a graduated tax based on income. One possible objection to
this approach is that those whose marriages succeed would have to pay for those
whose marriages fail. However, a structure where those who pay in do not nec-
essarily get money out is already very much a part of the tax system in this
country. Public assistance, for example, is paid for from general tax revenues.
Similarly, all workers are required to pay into the social security system even
though there is no guarantee that any particular person will live long enough to
collect benefits.
The alternative would be to create a fund from general tax revenues. This
approach would have the advantage of eliminating concerns as to whether tax-
ing marriage would have a deterrent effect on the decision to marry. However,
it does little to address other potential problems.
First, it is questionable whether sufficient funds could be collected to make
a difference in the standard of living of a substantial number of divorced
women. Current research indicates that the disparity between pre- and post-
155. Singer, supra note 22, at 1119; THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 206-07.
156. Insurance companies would likely be concerned about the problem of collusion. In the divorce context,
this would mean that the spouses formally divorce for the purpose of collecting divorce insurance benefits, but
continue thereafter to conduct their lives as husband and wife.
157. In his 1881 treatise, The Common Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes stated,
The state might conceivably make itself a mutual insurance company against accidents and distribute
the burden of its citizen's mishaps among all its members. There might be a pension for paralytics, and
state aid for those who suffered in person or estate from tempest or wild beasts. . . . The state does none
of these things, however, and the prevailing view is that its cumbersome and expensive machinery ought
not be set in motion unless some clear benefit is to be derived from disturbing the status quo. State
interference is an evil where it cannot be shown to be a good. Universal insurance, if desired, can be better
and more cheaply accomplished by private enterprise.
HOLMES. THE COMMON LAW 94-96 (1881).
158. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(2)(1982).
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divorce standards of living for many women can be quite substantial.1 9 Another
problem involves fairness: Should the amount of money a divorced spouse re-
ceives be tied to a pre-divorce standard of living or simply be a lump sum paid
across the board? If the sum is tied to a pre-divorce standard, those needing the
money least would probably end up getting the most. On the other hand, unless
a person received enough money to make a difference in her standard of living,
the program would serve little purpose.160 Finally, at least initially, both spouses
may suffer a loss in standard of living at the time of divorce.6 1 Would either
spouse be eligible for funds, or just the one whose standard of living has suf-
fered most? 6 2
The possibility of a social insurance system for reducing losses resulting
from divorce does not seem to be a viable alternative. It would appear to be
more realistic and effective to continue the loss-sharing approach in which the
loss is shared by the other spouse. However, there is a need to adopt approaches
that increase the liklihood that a substantial compensatory award will be made.
One of the rationales for strict liability in tort is that as between the plain-
tiff and the defendant, the loss should be placed on the party in the better posi-
tion to bear it.'6 ' For example, products liability cases often involve institutional
defendants such as manufacturers or retailers. Such defendants are usually in a
stronger economic position than an individual plaintiff to bear the cost of an
accident. In the context of 6 divorce, the party best able to bear the loss is the
spouse who, post-divorce, is in the better financial position. This is likely to be
the spouse who leaves the marriage with an enhanced career asset. It seems
appropriate that this spouse should share the economic losses of the other.
The tort policy that the loss should be borne by the party in the best posi-
tion to pay for it is not a total departure from doctrines already well established
in family law. Many courts have long linked alimony awards to the ability to
pay of the economically more powerful spouse. 64
Another strict liability rationale for requiring the defendant to share the
plaintiff's loss is that the defendant has the ability to distribute the loss by ob-
taining liability insurance, or by passing on the cost of the judgment by raising
the price of his product.6 5
159. THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 14.
160. If such a system were to be instituted, it should at least incorporate a means test designed to insure that
only those who are in need of assistance would be compensated.
161. However, there is empirical evidence that suggests that any initial loss is soon made up. See infra note
167.
162. A further question is whether such a fund would be available to another potentially significant
group-women who have cohabitated rather than married. In some instances, long-term cohabitations are the
functional equivalent to marriage and include children. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1294
(1979) (three children); Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 407 N.E.2d 438, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1980) (two
children). The law has been increasingly willing to provide remedies for cohabitants at the end of their relation-
ships. See infra note 193.
163. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 72, at 536. This is not a new idea in tort law. See, e.g., Feezer,
Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 809-10
(1930).
164. See supra note 10 and cases cited therin.
165. W. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L. 1099, 1120 (1960); W. PROSSER & P. KEETON,
supra note 72 at 537.
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The possibility of social insurance to cover some divorce losses has already
been discussed. 66 Although insurance can function as a loss-spreading device in
a number of contexts, the conclusion here was that insurance would not operate
effectively to reduce losses resulting from divorce. It could also be argued that a
loss-spreading rationale does not support strict liability for divorce because the
economically more powerful spouse does not have the ability to pass on the loss
to others.
There are several possible responses to this argument. First of all, the word
"loss" may not be appropriate to describe money paid as alimony in cases where
one spouse's career has been enhanced by the sacrifices of the other. The spouse
whose career has been enhanced continues, for a lifetime, to reap the financial
and psychological benefits accrued. Overall, he has probably gained more than
he has lost. Moreover, research by Lenore Weitzman suggests that for many
husbands, any initial loss is soon made up. 67 Finally, societal patterns with re-
spect to remarriage increase the possibilities that the husband will be able to
mitigate some of his losses.' 6  Since more divorced men than divorced women
remarry, it is much more likely that a former husband will remarry than that
his former wife will. Since today, most married women are in the workplace,169
the husband's second marriage is likely to be one in which there are two in-
comes. This second income can help to offset the money paid to the former
spouse as alimony. Thus, while an enhanced spouse may not be able to pass the
loss on to an insurance company or to the public, he has other possibilities of
lessening the impact of any losses he might suffer. 17 0
B. Fairness and Reliance
Fairness, whether in torts or family law, is a difficult concept to define. In
torts, fairness can reflect a melding of many principles, including the relation-
166. See supra text accompanying notes 154-61.
167. Weitzman's study concluded with the troubling, startling statistic that one year after divorce, the aver-
age former husband's standard of living had risen by 42%. while the former wife's declined by 73%. THE DI-
VORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 337-43. Weitzman attributed these different economic consequences to
several factors: the inadequacy of court awards, expanded demands on the wife's resources after divorce, and the
husband's greater earning capacity and ability to supplement his income. Id. See also McLindon, supra note 46,
at 391-95 (also arguing that men emerge from divorce in a better economic situation than women, and by some
measures in a better situation than pre-divorce). Weitzman's finding has been widely discussed. See, e.g., S. HEW-
LETr. A LESSER LIFE: THE MYTH OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN AMERICA 14 (1986); Kammeycr, Book Review, 48
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 455 (1986); Scarf, Cruel Contracts (Book Review), 194 THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 21,
1986 at 35, 37.
168. Of women who divorce, about three fourths eventually remarry, compared to about 5 out of 6 men. A.
CHERLIN. MARRIAGE. DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 29 (1981). These figures do not parse out the disadvantages women
face as they grow older. Weitzman has given women in their 30's a 50% chance of remarriage, and those over 40
a 28% chance. THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 204.
169. Recent Census data reveals that in 1988 more than half of all married women (56.7 %) were employed.
CENSUS, supra note 16, at 385.
170. Obviously, it will not always be true that the second spouse will be an economic asset rather than an
economic liability. Since men typically earn more than women do, see supra note 21, it is obvious that most men
marry women who earn less money than they do. These women may also bring to the marriage one or more
children whose costs are not adequately met by child support payments from her prior spouse.
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ship of the parties, the public interest, and the nature of the risk resulting in the
loss. 171
The concept of fairness is just as elusive in family law. What is considered
fair is inevitably quite subjective. It is a function of the values attached to many
variables such as the length of the marriage and the ages and earning capacities
of the spouses. It can also reflect personal views concerning the division of roles
within marriage, and beliefs as to what constitutes the appropriate motivations,
choices, and expectations of marriage partners.
One argument grounded in fairness for imposing liability on the spouse
whose career has been enhanced in one of the marriage patterns described in
the Introduction to this Article is that the risks undertaken by the spouses are
of such different magnitudes. It could be argued that the risks of marriage are
always reciprocal. Both spouses take a risk that the marriage will fail, and
clearly, both risk the emotional pain that generally accompanies divorce. How-
ever, it is clear that in the event of divorce, the economic loss often falls more
heavily on one spouse than the other.
In many marriages, the wife invests in her husband. This investment may
take many forms, including sending him to school, or providing him with do-
mestic service and emotional support that enables him to devote his full energies
to his career. In many cases, the wife also provides the lion's share of child care.
In the event of a divorce, she has probably forfeited many career options and
her chances to remarry have also been substantially reduced.
On the other hand, the spouse whose career has been enhanced has taken
very little risk. After the divorce, the investment of both spouses in his career
continues to inure to his separate benefit. Moreover, by virtue of his enhanced
professional and/or economic standard, he is likely to be even more desirable as
a marriage partner. Although it would seem difficult to address the problem of
increased or decreased marriageability, it seems fair that at least the economic
risks of marital failure should be more evenly distributed.
A related argument grounded in fairness is that the wife may have relied to
her detriment on her husband's explicit or implicit representation that her sacri-
fices in the interest of the marriage would be rewarded. Although some may
cling to an idealistic notion that in a marriage spouses are motivated totally by
altruism, the reality is more likely that women who invest in the careers of their
husbands expect to be rewarded at a later date. Thus, they believe that the time
will come when the husband's career will be in full gear, the children will be
older, and they will comfortably reap the fruits of their sacrifices. However, in
the event of a divorce, these expectations go unfulfilled.7 2
Although the notion of protecting expectations would seem to be much
more relevant to contract than to tort law, protection of expectations has also
been described as a goal of tort law. In the products liability context, for exam-
ple, courts have expressed the view that consumers should be able to reasonably
171. TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY, supra note 145, at 4-158.
172. One writer has suggested that the function of alimony is to provide the wife with a contingent claim
payable in the event of divorce. See Landes, supra note 123. For further discussion of the nature of the investment
the wife often makes in the earlier years of a marriage, see ElIman, supra note 13.
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rely on the expectation that products they use will be safe. This reliance can be
based either on specific representations of the manufacturer or on a broader
notion of a general expectation of safety. 73 Moreover, in other contexts, the law
has long recognized that certain relationships give rise to specific expectations
that one party will take care not to injure the other. Thus, a standard higher
than ordinary care is imposed on innkeepers and common carriers, and those
having fiduciary duties.174 An approach that reflects expectations of care, pro-
tection, and loyalty would clearly be appropriate in the marriage context. 75
Another argument often advanced for strict liability in tort is that the de-
fendant is engaged in profit-making activity and should therefore be required to
pay for the harms such activity causes.1 78 Liability may be imposed even where
the court acknowledges that the defendant's activities themselves may provide
some benefit to the public.1
It can also be argued that it is only fair that the spouse whose career has
been enhanced during the course of the marriage should bear the costs that this
benefit to him has imposed on the other spouse. Indeed, the argument for re-
quiring the party making a profit to share the costs is even stronger in the do-
mestic relations context. In a products liability case, the injured consumer may
be only one of many thousands whose purchases have contributed to the defend-
ant's profits. In a divorce, however, the relationship between the party who has
benefitted and the party who has lost is much more direct. The sacrifices made
in the name of the marriage have contributed in a very specific, personal way to
the enhanced spouse's profit.
This rationale for strict liability in the divorce context is not based on an
idea of wrongdoing, overreaching, or exploitation. These concepts are, and
should be irrelevant in a true no-fault analysis. It is instead based on the simple
idea that one who has benefitted economically from an arrangment that has
resulted in loss to another should bear a part of that loss.
Two final but important issues bear on the question of fairness-the role of
choice and the effect of marketplace disparities.
173. TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY, supra note 145, at 4-184 to 4-187. In Escola v. Coca Cola, it
was noted that the consumers' "erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build
up confidence by advertising and marketing devices such as trademarks ... consumers no longer approach prod-
ucts warily but accept them on faith, relying on the reputation of the manufacturer or the trademark." Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 467, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). See also,
Fulbright v. Klamath Gas. Co., 271 Or. 449, 460, 533 P.2d 316, 321 (1975) (satisfaction of reasonable expecta-
tions of the purchaser or user).
174. TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY, supra note 145, at 4-186 to 4-187; FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra
note 30, at 40-41.
175. This has been recognized in some decisions. See, e.g., DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758
(Minn. 1981) (in exercising equitable authority, the court keeps in mind that one spouse has made an economic
sacrifice with the "reasonable expectation" of enjoying a higher standard of living); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J.
488, 502-03, 453 A.2d 527, 535 (1982) (shared expectations of increased income and material benefits justify
reimbursement alimony).
176. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 72, at 537.
177. State v. Ventron 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983) (strict liability for pollution caused by mercury
processing plant); Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 855, 567 P.2d 218 (1977) (strict liability imposed for
crop dusting pesticides settled on plaintiff's organic farm).
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One potential objection to strict liability for divorce losses is that it ignores
the role of choice. Thus, it could be argued that many women make an affirma-
tive choice to stay home or to emphasize family over career-they are not
forced to do so by their husbands. Such women often live quite comfortable
lifestyles, enjoying a standard of living they would have been unable to provide
for themselves. Under this analysis, if the wife suffers a loss upon divorce, it is a
result of her own lifestyle choice, and it was not caused by her husband.
Causation is a requirement for liability in tort, even under strict liability.17 8
Still, causation should not be a relevant issue in a divorce. It should not matter
what the decision making process was that led to the division of labor in a
particular marriage. No matter which spouse actively advocated the marital
structure ultimately adopted, the decision should be considered to be a joint
one. In light of this, it seems unfair to saddle the wife with a disproportionate
amount of the losses that may result from that decision. Secondly, assuming
that there is a causation issue, it can be answered easily by asking: Would the
wife have invested in the marriage and foregone opportunities for self-develop-
ment in the absence of an expectation of later reaping the benefits of such a
sacrifice? 179 Finally, the notion of choice in this context is a complex one. To
state that women who compromise their careers in favor of family life choose to
do so simplifies what is a much more complex issue. Although individual prefer-
ences do play a part, women's choices with respect to marriage and family life
are also a function of the messages women receive from society concerning ap-
propriate gender roles. These messages may also be reinforced by specific class
and cultural expectations. 8 '
A final issue that bears on fairness is the problem of marketplace dispari-
ties. The fact that women often make sacrifices in favor of their marriages is
not the only reason that they may be left in a disadvantageous position at the
time of divorce. The losses women suffer as a result of these sacrifices are com-
pounded by the fact that in the marketplace, most women make less money
than most men.""" This fact raises the hard issue as to whether it is fair that an
individual husband should have to pay for the discrimination that the world
visits upon women as a group.
In most of the marriage patterns described in this Article, the wife had
made sacrifices or compromises that clearly caused her to forego opportunities
178. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
179. See Ellman, supra note 13 at 40-53.
180. See Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHi. L. REv. 1129 (1986), where the
author argues that women often form "adaptive preferences" in which their choices with respect to spousal rela-
tions reflect their experiences in a system that restricts their opportunities, id. at 1145-46.
This is not to deny that there arc some women who would choose to stay home with their children rather than
work outside of the home even in a society where there was complete equality between the sexes. There are
probably many individuals, male and female, who would derive greater personal satisfaction from the domestic
role than from working outside of the home. Still, the decision that one spouse will play the domestic role is one
that both parties must agree to if the marriage is to continue. The fact that the spouse who stayed at home in fact
preferred that role should be irrelevant.
One of the advantages of strict liability in tort law is that it is not based on a paradigm of reasonableness. For
similar reasons the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk should not apply to the divorce
context. The role of these doctrines in strict liability in tort is in a state of evolution. See supra note 138.
181. See supra note 21.
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in the workplace and that clearly benefitted the husband. Thus, although mar-
ketplace disparities would compound her loss, a major part of her loss could be
identified as the lost opportunities and reduced earning capacity she suffered
because of her absence from or diminished participation in the workplace for
several years.
Let us hypothesize a fact pattern that permits a more stark isolation of the
market disparity issue. Assume that a male doctor marries a female secretary.
The marriage lasts twenty years, during which time both spouses remain em-
ployed. They have no children. Then there is a divorce. The wife will clearly
suffer a long term loss in her standard of living; she will no longer enjoy the
standard of living of a doctor's wife.
It could be argued that this scenario does not fit the sacrifice/benefit para-
digm because: 1) to a great degree, the husband had already attained his pro-
fessional status at the time of the marriage; 2) the wife's career choices had
already been made at the time of the marriage; and 3) during the marriage, the
wife lived at a much higher standard of living than she would have been able to
provide for herself.
Does the strict liability argument advanced in this Article provide a ration-
ale for alimony for such a spouse? Causation is a problem here too, because her
losses are not a function of a marriage structure in which she has foregone
opportunities she otherwise might have pursued. Instead, her continuing eco-
nomic losses are a function of the societal realities that doctors earn more than
secretaries, and men tend to be doctors while women tend to be secretaries.
It could be argued that because men benefit from discrimination it is not
unfair that they should have to pay for it. Another argument could draw from
the tort analogy of the thin skull rule, which holds a defendant liable for all of
the plaintiff's injuries even those caused by the plaintiff's unusual vulnerabili-
ties."" Under this analysis, if women's position in the society makes them more
vulnerable economically at divorce, the amount the husband must pay should
accomodate this reality. However, it is not necessary to reach either of these
controversial arguments, because a rationale for alimony, in appropriate cases,
can be based on other factors. First, even though both parties were employed,
the wife still probably performed a larger share of the domestic responsibilities
than the husband.""3 Thus, some compensation could be based on her contribu-
tion to the marriage under other rationales for alimony such as partnership or
sharing principles, 84 and the strict liability doctrine need not even be invoked.
Secondly, a reliance argument would be appropriate in those cases in which the
marriage has been a long one. There, it could be argued that the length of the
marriage created an expectation of a continued lifestyle at a certain level. Obvi-
ously such a reliance interest would be much weaker in a short marriage. In
cases where the wife has made no appreciable sacrifice, or the marriage has
been a short one, alimony may not be warranted at all.
182. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 72, at 292; Stoleson v. United States, 708 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir.
1983).
183. See A. HOCHSCHILD & A. MACHUNG, supra note 143; R. Hertz, supra note 143.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 117-22 and 126-28.
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C. Reducing the Burden on the Public Fisc
Economic losses caused by personal injury and economic losses caused by
divorce both can have implications that go far beyond the individuals involved.
Imposing strict liability in tort on certain classes of activities promotes the like-
lihood that the defendant rather than the public will pay for the losses suffered
by the injured party.
The law governing divorce also reflects concern for the public interest.
There are a number of legal rules designed to decrease the possibility that a
former spouse will wind up destitute. For example, many courts will void an
antenuptial contract that would leave one party to the contract a public
charge.185 Also, primary reasons for the duty of support 8 6 and the doctrine of
necessaries187 are that the public should not have to bear the economic costs of
an ongoing marriage that can be borne by the other spouse. An approach that
conceptualizes alimony as a legitimate form of compensation for losses incurred
as a result of compromises in the interest of the marital unit increases the
chances that alimony will be awarded. This decreases the chances that the eco-
nomically disadvantaged spouse will ever have to turn to public funds for
support.
D. Deterrence
Deterrence would seem to be a more important consideration in torts s18
than in family law. However, the question of the effect of legal rules on behav-
ior is an important one in both areas. One function of tort law is that of setting
standards of conduct: imposing liability for certain types of behavior signals
those who would engage in those behaviors that they will be held accountable
for the losses they cause. The hope is that the rule of law will assist in shaping
human behavior in ways considered socially desirable. 89
In family law, courts frequently discuss the effect of a legal rule on the
institutions of marriage and the family.' 90 This raises the question as to the
possible effects of a rule that would basically require payment of alimony in
marriages that fit the sacrifice/benefit paradigm.
There are several relevant issues: First, the effect on the decision to marry;
second, the effect on the decision to divorce; third, the effect on the allocation of
185. See, e.g., Connolly v. Connolly, 270 N.W.2d 44 (S.D. 1978); Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act and the Uniform Premarital Agreements Act
both permit courts to override agreements in which the provisions governing spousal support would have the effect
of leaving one spouse a public charge. See U.M.P.A. § 10(i); U.P.A.A. § 6(b).
186. See CLARK. supra note 5, at § 6.1.
187. See CLARK, supra note 5, at § 6.3.
188. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 72, at 25-26; CALABRESI, supra note 74 (passim).
189. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 72, at 25-26. Even in tort law, the relationship between legal
rules and behavior is still a controversial issue, regardless of whether the rule in question is negligence or strict
liability. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 136, at 32-33.
190. For example, some courts have rejected remedies between cohabitants on the ground that providing such
remedies undermines marriage or, in effect, revives common law marriage, which most states have abolished. See,
e.g.. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979).
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roles during the marriage; fourth, the effect on the bargaining process at the
time of divorce.
Since the law continues to place a high value on marriage, 19' the first issue
is whether such a rule would deter people from getting married. It is unlikely to
have much of a deterrent effect. First, people marry for a host of reasons other
than economic ones. These reasons may include personal preferences, religious
beliefs and a desire to conform to the expectations of families, friends and com-
munities. Second, even under the old fault rules, people did not necessarily as-
sume that they could walk away from their marriages without incurring costs.
This did not discourage people from getting married. Finally, people who co-
habit rather than marry can still incur significant liabilities in states that recog-
nize contract and equitable remedies between cohabitants. The high profile of
certain cases such as Marvin v. Marvin9' has probably resulted in some vague
public awareness that cohabitation too, can have legal consequences.' 93
The second issue is the possible effect on rates of divorce. It is clear that
no-fault divorce makes divorce easier. Certainly the present system in which the
enhanced spouse is able to walk away with most of the career assets gives that
spouse incentive to end an unhappy marriage. A strict liability approach that
would require compensation in most cases would probably deter some people
from getting a divorce, But here, too, the rule would likely have a limited effect.
People decide to leave marriages all the time, even when they are aware that
the economic costs may be substantial.
A strict liability approach might have two other possible effects. One is
discouraging couples from structuring their marriages so that one party is en-
gaging in most of the self-sacrificing behavior. If the enhanced spouse knows
that he will be required to share his post-divorce income with his former spouse,
he may be less interested in a marital structure that is so one-sided with respect
to benefits and sacrifices. This may mean, as a practical matter, that both par-
ties go to law school, or that they share household tasks and child rearing re-
sponsibilities more equally, even though this may mean less career advancement
for both. But even here, it is doubtful that a strict liability rule would have a
major effect. The structuring of marital roles is a function of many non-legal
factors, including personal preferences and cultural and class norms. Moreover,
until they find themselves in the unfortunate context of divorce, most people are
woefully uninformed about what they would be entitled to in the event that
their marriage ended.
191. Even as it extended the broadest remedies to cohabitatants in Marvin v. Marvin, the California Su-
preme Court felt compelled to extoll the virtues of marriage ("the structure of society itself depends upon the
institution of marriage, and nothing we have said in this opinion should be taken to derogate from that institu-
tion"). 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 832 (1976).
192. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 (1976).
193. In Marvin, the California Supreme Court held that contracts between cohabitants respecting earnings
and property are enforceable, and that relief could also be granted on the basis of theories of implied contract and
equitable remedies. Some jurisdictions have permitted recovery based on some or all of the theories expressed in
Marvin. See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 407 N.E.2d 438, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1980) (express con-
tract only); Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987) (express, implied and equitable remedies).
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The most significant effect the rule might have is that of deterring unfair
bargaining in the dissolution process. If the advantaged spouse knows that the
other spouse has a well established right to substantial compensation, he may be
more willing to bargain fairly than he would under a system that does not rec-
ognize such a right. Obviously this does not determine how much compensation
the spouse, who has forgone opportunites, would be entitled to receive. How-
ever, it would go a long way in establishing the idea that she is entitled to
something that will substantially reduce post-divorce economic disparities be-
tween the parties. What seems especially promising about this approach is that
it may give back to women some of the leverage they lost under no-fault.194
E. System Costs and Administrative Costs
In addition to reducing the losses of the spouse who has made sacrifices, a
strict liability theory could have a positive effect on other costs of divorce. The
possibility of the public bearing the secondary costs of divorce is decreased if
the economic losses from the marriage are internalized between the spouses
rather than externalized to the public. Also, administrative costs to the public
would be decreased if litigation is not required to establish a right to alimony,195
or to convince the court that the award should be permanent. If both parties
know that the court is likely to award some alimony, they may be encouraged to
settle rather than litigate. Thus the rule could have the effect of furthering an-
other important goal of tort law---encouraging settlements."96 Litigation costs
might still be incurred in those cases where couples dispute issues such as the
degree of sacrifice made during the marriage or the degree of economic disad-
vantage suffered. However, even if litigation costs are not significantly reduced,
the reduction in losses to disadvantaged spouses and the potential savings to the
public fisc still make the strict liability approach worthwhile.
F. Consistency and Predictability
One criticism of the fault system in torts is that it permits widely divergent
treatment of people who have suffered similar losses. Advocates of no-fault au-
tomobile insurance, for example, argued that under the fault system, many acci-
dent victims went unpaid or were paid only a fraction of their losses, while
many who suffered trivial injuries were overpaid. 197 In family law, although a
number of statutes set forth general criteria for the award of alimony, 198 these
statutes give no indication as to how much weight any particular factor should
194. See supra text accompanying notes 46-57.
195. A number of scholars have concluded that when the outcome of a case is uncertain, the parties will
differ in their predictions of the outcome and, therefore, will be more likely to litigate the dispute. See Mnookin &
Kornhauser, supra note 53; see also Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
I. 13-20 (1984).
196. TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY, supra note 145, at 4-209.
197. R. KEETON. J. O'CONNELL & J. MCCORD, supra note 90 (Forward); BASIC PROTECTION, supra note 25,
at 2.
198. See. e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-82 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(d) (1983); WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 767.26 (1981).
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be given or as to whether any particular substantive outcome is desired. As a
result, awards of alimony remain largely subject to judicial discretion. A num-
ber of scholars have argued that divorce doctrines that rely on judicial discre-
tion operate to women's disadvantage. 199 This is not suprising. Although a sub-
stantial number of women still play the traditional roles in which the husband is
either the sole provider or is the spouse whose career needs take priority, statis-
tically only a small number of women are awarded alimony. 00 A principle that
mandates the award of alimony as compensation for losses incurred as a result
of these marital roles would reduce judicial discretion and hopefully result in
more awards of this important form of divorce compensation.
None of the foregoing discussion tells us how much alimony should be
awarded in a particular case. In tort law, there is a general maxim that the
purpose of damages is to compensate the plaintiff fully.21 However, there is
also a recognition that in a very real sense, full compensation is not possible. 0 2
Nor can full recovery be expected in the divorce setting. In many cases, the loss
of economies of scale makes full compensation for economic losses impossible.
Emotional losses are an even more complex issue.
There have been a number of proposals addressed to the issues of the
amount and duration of alimony. It has been suggested that the parties be re-
quired to continue to share income for a set number of years after marriage
based on the length of the marriage.20 3 It has also been suggested that where
alimony is to be of limited duration, the standard for termination should be one
of self-sufficiency adequate to compensate the economically disadvantaged
spouse for benefits conferred and earning capacity lost during the marriage.20
The reality, however, is probably that the economically weaker spouse can never
be put back in as good a position as she was in prior to the termination of the
marriage.
What constitutes appropriate compensation at the end of a marriage is a
complex issue with which family law scholars will continue to struggle. How-
ever, whatever approach is eventually adopted should focus on the idea of equal
sharing of the risk of loss to ensure that there is equal sharing of both the
benefits and the burdens of the failed marriage. 05
In tort law, the amount of compensation awarded the plaintiff is also af-
fected by the doctrine of mitigation of damages. 0 6 This doctrine requires the
199. See THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 384 (equitable v. equal distribution); McLindon,
supra note 46, at 404 (child support and alimony). See also Singer & Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47
MD. L. REV. 497, 519-20 (1988) (custody).
200. See supra note 14.
201. See supra text accompanying note 145.
202. See Franklin, supra note 73, at 791. For example, a person's inability to engage in activities or hobbies
he formerly enjoyed cannot be restored and it could be argued that no amount of money can really compensate for
this loss.
203. Singer, supra note 22, at 1117.18.
204. See, e.g., Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses and Abuses of Limited Duration Alimony, 21 FAM.
L.Q. 573, 588 (1988). For another approach, see, Ellman, supra note 13, at 53-71.
205. A number of writers have advocated some form of "result equality" at the end of a marriage. See, e.g.,
Fineman, supra note 47, at 826-42; THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 14, at 357-401.
206. This is also sometimes referred to as the doctrine of avoidable consequences. See W. PROSSER & P.
KEETON, supra note 72, at 458-59.
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plaintiff to take reasonable steps to lessen the impact of her injury. To the ex-
tent that the plaintiff fails to do this, the defendant is not liable for those dam-
ages that could have been prevented. In the marriage context, there remains the
difficult question of balancing compensation with the view that, in appropriate
cases, the former spouse should have some incentive to lessen her own losses.20 7
This raises a difficult issue. The question as to how extensive compensation
should be has implications beyond the effect on particular individuals-there is
a political dimension as well. Rules that protect the economic interests of
women who play traditional roles in marriages also have a downside. They may
encourage women to play dependent roles.2°8 If women know that sacrifices in
favor of their marriages will be rewarded in the event of divorce, they may be
more willing to play traditional roles rather than put effort into becoming eco-
nomically self-sufficient.
There are negative consequences to economic dependence on a marriage,
even if the marriage does not end in divorce. In a worst case scenario, economic
dependence can result in an increased willingness to tolerate emotionally or even
physically abusive behavior. Moreover, the dependent role has risks even in a
happy, successful marriage. The husband might die, or suddenly become dis-
abled or unemployed. It could be argued that women need to be placed on no-
tice of the need to become more independent so that they need not depend on
the legal system to protect their economic interests in the event of divorce or on
the social welfare system to protect them in the event of other disasters. Rules
that provide for less than "full" compensation in the event of divorce may have
the effect of encouraging independence.209
One problem in supporting an approach that provides less than full com-
pensation on the theory that it will encourage economic independence is that
this seems unfair to those women for whom it must constantly seem that the
rules are changing in the middle of the game.210 Many older women who today
find themselves in the midst of divorce entered into marriage at an earlier time,
in which there were different expectations, values, and far fewer options outside
of marriage. 211 Rules that may serve a positive function for younger women
may simply punish older ones.
A kind of "grandmother clause" may be one way to address the problem.
Under such an approach, new rules would apply only to marriages entered into
after a certain date or only to marriages of a certain duration. However, the
problem would still remain that most people, men or women, young or old, are
quite unaware of what the law is. Secondly, for many women, playing economi-
cally dependent or self-sacrificing roles in marriage is very much a function of
207. The notion of rehabilitative alimony is similar to mitigation of damages in that both doctrines require
the party suffering losses to take reasonable steps to reduce her losses. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
208. See Kay, supra note 43, at 80.
209. Professor Herma Hill Kay has argued that changing no-fault divorce rules so as not to disadvatage
women who have played the traditional roles can have the inadvertent effect of perpetuating female dependence by
supporting the choice of such roles. See, Kay, supra note 43, at 85, 90.
210. See generally, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 14.
211. Id.
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values related to class and ethnicity. It would seem patently unfair to penalize
people for choices that are a function of such factors.
Moreover, there remains the question as to whether the choices women
make concerning their roles in marriage would be affected by any legal rule.
Behavior is shaped by many extra-legal considerations, including personal
choice, age, class, culture, and the perception of one's options. It may be that
there is no rule that would have a material effect on women's decision-making
concerning choices between family life and work.
The dilemma of encouraging women to be independent while protecting
those who have played more traditional roles in marriage must continue to be
addressed. Of course, the encouragement of economic independence must also
be accompanied by a struggle to make the marketplace one in which there is
opportunity to achieve. At the same time, efforts must continue to ensure com-
pensation for those women who suffer economic losses as a result of playing
traditional roles.
V. CONCLUSION
No-fault divorce and tort law approaches, eliminating consideration of
fault, gained acceptance during the same period, but these parallel develop-
ments had very different consequences.
Clearly, the parameters of liability without fault in tort law are still un-
clear. However, in those areas where it has been applied, the focus has been on
rationales and mechanisms to promote compensation of the party suffering
losses. In family law, however, criticism of the effect of no-fault divorce has
only recently forced us to think about what the relationship should be between
no-fault and the economic consequences of the "accident" of divorce.
No-fault divorce should have the same focus as liability without fault in
torts-promoting compensation for losses. Many of the same rationales that
support strict liability in tort support adequate compensation at the end of a
marriage for the losses incurred by the many spouses who sacrifice or compro-
mise their individual interests in furtherance of their marriage. Unless no-fault
divorce is reconceptualized so as to ensure compensation to such spouses, what
was hailed to be a significant step forward in family law may prove to be, at
best, little more than a cosmetic change.
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